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Blakely's Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines,
Judicial Discretion, and Crime
JOANNA SHEPHERD*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decisions that struck down state and
federal criminal sentencing guidelines have caused a cascade of
commentary expressing dread and predicting disaster. However, the
decisions could have a substantial and surprising benefit: reduced crime.
In this study, I show that sentencing guidelines are associated with
increases, not decreases, in crime-contrary to the motivating
expectations of the tough-on-crime supporters of guidelines in the 1970s
and i98os. If this increase is caused by reduced judicial discretion in
criminal sentencing, then expanding judicial discretion, by eliminating or
modifying the guidelines, may lead to decreases in crime.
In its recent landmark Blakely and Booker decisions, the Supreme
Court found that both Washington state and federal sentencing
guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.' The guidelines were deemed
* Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. I thank Robert Ahdieh,
Morgan Cloud, Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Dhammika Dharmapala, Martha Duncan, Nuno Garoupa, Kay
Levine, Marc Miller, Paul H. Rubin, George B. Shepherd, William G. Shepherd, Robert D. Tollison,
Fred Tung, and participants at the 2005 American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings,
the American Economics Association 2003 Annual Meetings, the Comparative Law & Economics
Forum, and the Georgia State University seminar for helpful comments. I thank Gilson Gray, Derek
Kung, and Christine Stemm for excellent research assistance.
i. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 267 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
305 (2004). The Court set the stage for Blakely and Booker in three earlier decisions. See Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 61o (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2ooo); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 249-51 (1999). In Jones, the Court held that a federal carjacking statute would be
unconstitutional if it allowed judges to determine the existence of sentencing factors that would
increase a defendant's sentence. 526 U.S. at 249-51. In 2000, the Court went further, ruling in
Apprendi that racial bias must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a judge could
impose an enhanced hate crime sentence. 530 U.S. at 477. Two years later in Ring, the Supreme Court
extended this reasoning to capital cases by requiring juries to rule on aggravating factors that could
result in a penalty of death. 536 U.S. at 61o. In 2004 in Blakely, the Court expanded these rulings to
include sentencing guidelines. 542 U.S. at 305. In 2005 in Booker, the Court confirmed Blakely's far-
reaching impact by ruling that, like the Washington sentencing guidelines held to violate the Sixth
Amendment in Blakely, sections of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were constitutionally flawed.
543 U.S. at 267.
[5331
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
invalid because they allowed the judge to determine factual issues during
sentencing that should have been decided by the jury.'
Although Blakely and Booker specifically found unconstitutional
only provisions of the Washington state and federal sentencing systems,3
the decisions threaten the systems of many other states. In her Blakely
dissent, Justice O'Connor identified nine other states whose sentencing
regimes may also be unconstitutional under Blakely.4 Others have
concluded that the sentencing regimes of all but five of the eighteen
states with sentencing guidelines are threatened
Many commentators, scholars, and judges have expressed dread
about the decisions' expected impact.6 For example, Justice O'Connor
wrote in Blakely, "What I have feared most has now come to pass: Over
twenty years of sentencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands
of criminal judgments are in jeopardy."7 After noting that "the practical
consequences of today's decision are disastrous," she discussed "the
damage that today's decision will cause" and "the havoc it is about to
wreak on trial courts across the county."8
The gloom is deep in many camps because sentencing guidelines
were propelled into law by a grand coalition of diverse groups with
different goals. Many supporters wanted guidelines because they hoped
that they would eliminate inequality and racial discrimination in
sentencing. In contrast, law-and-order types, such as Ronald Reagan,
Strom Thurmond, and J. Edgar Hoover, supported guidelines as a get-
tough measure that would reduce crime.' Indeed, many states' guidelines
statutes themselves proclaim as a central purpose the reduction of
crime."
2. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 755-56; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305, 313. For example, in Blakely the
Court declared provisions of Washington's sentencing guidelines system unconstitutional. 542 U.S. at
303-05. The Washington guidelines allowed judges both to make factual findings about aggravating
and mitigating factors and then, based on those findings, to impose penalties above or below a
recommended standard range of sentences. Id. at 299-3o0. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury prohibits a judge from imposing a sentence above the standard range if the longer
sentence is based on an aggravating fact that has been neither proved to a jury nor admitted by the
defendant. See id. at 303-05.
3. See Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
4. See 542 U.S. at 323 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
5. See Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing. Blakely v. Washington: Practical
Implications for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SEwr'G REP. 6o, 62 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at
Cross-Purposes, tO5 COLUM. L. REV. io82, io87-88 (2005); Josh Jacobson, Blakely v. Washington: Off
the Judicial Richter Scale, BENCH & B. OF MINN., Sept. 2004, at 24.
7. 542 U.S. at 326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 314, 315,324 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9. See discussion infra Part I.A.
io. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-9o-8oi (2006) (stating that one of the primary purposes of
sentencing is "to deter criminal behavior and foster respect for the law").
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Although the federal guidelines have been subject to widespread
criticism in recent years, the popularity of most state guidelines systems
continues." Hence, while many scholars hope that Blakely and Booker
will not require states to abandon their guidelines systems completely,
most agree that they will force dramatic changes in sentencing systems.2
Several possible alternatives have emerged. They include a fully
determinate sentencing system with no judicial discretion; a return to the
original system of indeterminate sentencing; jury factfinding in
sentencing; and advisory guidelines.'3 However, the consensus of
commentators is that each of the alternatives would be substantially
worse than the original guidelines systems.' Flaws in the alternatives
include unfettered prosecutorial discretion, greater disparity in
sentencing, more complexity and expense during trial, and a greater
reliance on plea bargaining. 5
However, the gloom may not be completely warranted. Surprisingly,
the sentencing changes resulting from Blakely and Booker could have an
important positive consequence. I demonstrate theoretically and
empirically that alternatives to guidelines that expand judicial discretion
may decrease crime. This is because, contrary to the expectations of many
of the original tough-on-crime supporters, the reduced discretion under
guidelines is associated with increases in crime, not decreases. Moreover,
the increase has been substantial. In states with guidelines, the guidelines
are associated with approximately an 8% increase in violent crime and a
7% increase in property crime, after controlling for other variables.'
6
I first develop four economic theories about why sentencing
guidelines and reduced judicial discretion might increase crime, followed
by two theories about how guidelines might cause crime instead to
decrease. These are the theories that this Article's later sections will then
test empirically. All six of the theories reflect the fact that guidelines
ii. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1192 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1050-51
(2005); Reitz, supra note 6, at lO87, I io7-o8; Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 6o-64; Katie M. McVoy,
Note, 'What I Have Feared Most Has Now Come To Pass': Blakely, Booker, and the Future of
Sentencing, 8o NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613, 1613-14 (2005).
13. See Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 61-64; McVoy, supra note 12, at 621-41. Several of
these alternatives are also discussed in Justice Breyer's Blakely dissent. 542 U.S. at 328-340 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
14. See, e.g., 542 U.S. at 328-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Reitz, supra note 6, at 1o8-o9; McVoy,
supra note 12, at 1614, 1621-41.
15. See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 6, at 11o8-o9; McVoy, supra note 12, at 1621-41. Likewise, Justice
Breyer explains the flaws in the alternatives in his Blakely dissent. See 542 U.S. at 328-340 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). But see Michael Marcus, Blakely, Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 17 FED. SENr'G
REP. 243, 245-46 (2005); Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 64-67, for a more optimistic view of the
alternatives.
6. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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reduce the variation in prison sentences: fewer long and short sentences
occur because a judge is required or encouraged to sentence within the
guidelines' intermediate range.
This reduced variation could increase crime for four reasons. First,
crime may increase if guidelines prevent judges from imposing the long
sentences required to deter the highest-risk criminals. Second, increases
in crime could occur if, as survey and anecdotal evidence suggests,
prosecutors, judges, and juries are reluctant to charge or convict low-risk
criminals of crimes that carry harsh guidelines sentences. Facing no
penalty, these criminals may be neither deterred from committing crime
nor incapacitated.
Third, crime could increase if judges and prosecutors follow
guidelines and imprison low-risk offenders for longer periods than
without guidelines. Removing them from society, forcing them to live
with and learn from other criminals, and reducing their future job
prospects may increase recidivism.
Fourth, because guidelines reduce the range of penalties, including
the highest penalties, criminals may perceive sentencing under guidelines
as less risky and, thus, less harsh. Criminals who are risk-averse may be
less deterred.
In contrast, two competing economic theories explain how
sentencing guidelines might decrease crime. First, studies indicate that
guidelines have tended not only to reduce the variation in sentences, but
also to increase the average sentence lengths and incarceration rates for
violent crimes. Longer sentences and higher incarceration rates might
deter additional crime.
Second, some potential criminals may dislike the guidelines'
reduction in variance. Although guidelines reduce their chances of
getting a very high sentence, they also reduce their chances of getting a
very low sentence. Thus, if criminals are risk-loving, then more-certain
guidelines that reduce the chance of very low sentences may be
perceived as more harsh, and as a result, will deter some offenders from
committing crime.
Next, I test the competing theories empirically. Although any or all
of the theories may explain part of the relationship between guidelines
and crime, I explore the net effect using a national, state-level data set
that covers the period between 196o-2ooo. Although studies have
examined the effect of sentencing guidelines on other aspects of criminal
justice-sentencing disparity, sentence lengths, sentencing uniformity,
incarceration rates, plea negotiation practices, and prison populations-
this Article is the first study to use regression analysis to explore the
[Vo1. 58:533
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relationship between state sentencing guidelines and crime.' 7
My findings that guidelines are associated with increases in both
violent crime and property crime are robust across many specifications.
For example, the results persist both in specifications that control for
sentencing reforms other than guidelines and in specifications that
control for possible reverse causality-that control for the possibility that
guidelines might be adopted during periods of high crime. Moreover,
additional analyses suggest that the more judges are required to comply
with the guidelines, the larger the associated increases in crime.
If policymakers begin to recognize that constraining judicial
discretion is associated with increases in crime, rather than reducing it,
then some states that now have sentencing guidelines may not resurrect
them after Blakely and Booker. Based on my empirical results, I discuss
the expected impact on crime of each of the alternative sentencing
systems that Justice Breyer suggested in his dissent in Blakely and his
majority opinion in Booker: a "pure charge" regime, a fully
indeterminate sentencing system, sentencing juries, and a system of
advisory sentencing guidelines.'8 If, after Blakely and Booker, states
either eliminate their guidelines or choose alternatives that expand
judicial discretion, then crime may decrease.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I discusses the purpose and
history of state sentencing guidelines, and Part II offers theoretical
predictions of guidelines' impacts on crime. Part III presents empirical
analyses of the relationship between guidelines and seven different crime
categories. Part IV discusses the results' implications for the alternative
sentencing systems suggested by Justice Breyer. The conclusion discusses
the results' implications in light of Blakely and Booker.
I. PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A complete understanding of this Article's theoretical predictions
and empirical findings requires a brief discussion of the purposes and
history of state sentencing guidelines.
17. For a general discussion of other articles' findings, see Dale Parent et al., Key Legislative
Issues in Criminal Justice: The Impact of Sentencing Guidelines, in NATIONAL INsTrrUTE OF JUSTICE
RESEARCH IN ACTION (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, NCJ r61837, 1996); Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions
in Sentencing Guidelines, in ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, NCJ
165043, 1997). The only other empirical study compares the raw data on crime rates between
guidelines and non-guidelines states, but without using regression analysis or accounting for other
possible influences. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED
SENTENCING 116 (1996). The authors conclude that because guidelines and non-guidelines states have
similar crime rates, guidelines have little measurable impact on crime. Id.
I8. See discussion infra Part IV; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246-268 (2oo5);
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 320-340 (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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A. ORIGINAL GOALS OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES
States adopted sentencing guidelines in response to a growing
rejection of the discretionary and individualized punishments under the
previous system of indeterminate sentencing.'9 Through the mid-197Os,
all states and the federal system had such indeterminate systems." As
Professor Michael Tonry describes this period,
Mandatory penalties were few in number and modest in scope,
prosecutors had unaccountable power over charging and plea
bargaining, judges' sentencing discretion was constrained only by
statutory sentencing maximums, and parole boards had broad or
plenary authority to release prisoners subject, usually, only to the
maximum prison term set by the judge or the legislature.'
In the 1970s and early i98os, sentencing practices began to change as
three criticisms of indeterminate sentencing emerged.2 First, critics
asserted that indeterminate systems' sentencing disparities were unfair.23
Although numerous critics of sentencing disparity emerged,24 one notable
group was a committee of criminal justice scholars, the American Friends
Service Committee, which argued that racial discrimination in sentencing
was responsible for imprisonment disparities and, ultimately, prison
riots. 5 Another influential voice was United States District Judge Marvin
Frankel, who argued that indeterminate sentencing was "lawless.2
6
Second, rehabilitation fell from favor as a sentencing goal. An
important rationale for indeterminate sentencing was that judicial
discretion was needed so that judges could individually craft sentences to
match each offender's prospects for rehabilitation. However, several
studies in the 197os doubted the ability of prison programs to rehabilitate
offenders. 7
Third, critics blamed indeterminate sentencing for the period's
dramatically increasing crime rates, asserting that sentences were too
uncertain and too lenient."' A leading book on crime policy argued that
19. Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1233, 1245-68 (2005).
20. Id. at 1234.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 1245-48 (thoroughly discussing factors that led to the demise of indeterminate
sentencing demise).
23. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 17, at 1.
24. See, e.g., KATE ST1TH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 33-36 (1998) (discussing criticisms of sentencing disparities).
25. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 130 (1971) (discussing race implications in imprisonment context).
26. M.E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER iX-X (1972).
27. See, e.g., Robert Martinson, What Works?- Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUR. INT. 22-23, 49 (974); James Robinson & Gerald Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67, 8o (1g71).
28. See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 21, at 1247.
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only more-certain punishments could reduce crime.29
Sentencing guidelines, a form of "determinate sentencing," emerged
as a cure for these perceived failures of indeterminate sentencing.3 °
Guidelines systems ultimately became law at both the state and federal
levels3' because they attracted a diverse coalition with diverse goals: they
promised both to reduce unfair disparity and to crack down on criminals.
Many supporters believed that the guidelines, by restricting judicial
discretion, would reduce sentencing discrimination.
On the other hand, law-and-order types believed that guidelines
would result in more-certain, longer, harsher sentences that would
reduce crime.32 They believed that judicial discretion was inconsistent
with deterrence: the only way to increase deterrence was to limit judicial
discretion.33 For example, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed that the
bill that created the federal sentencing guidelines was a way to "crack
down" on criminals.34 Similarly, Senator Strom Thurmond, a leading
proponent of the federal guidelines, argued that the federal guidelines'
elimination of judicial discretion would reduce crime by restricting
excessively lenient sentencing.35 These tough-on-crime supporters of
guidelines could invoke former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. 6 Hoover
had frequently condemned indeterminate sentencing, asserting that both
the sentencing discretion that it gave judges and its focus on
rehabilitation produced excessively lenient punishments that increased
crime.37 Many others supported sentencing guidelines as a get-tough
program for crime reduction."5
Ultimately, both federal and state guidelines and other determinate
sentencing systems enjoyed strong bipartisan support.39 For example, in
California, determinate sentencing was propelled into law by an
29. JAMES 0. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME I I8-I9 (1983).
30. See Tonry, supra note 19, at 1245-48.
31. See discussion infra Part I.B (noting that eighteen states and the federal government have
adopted sentencing guidelines).
32. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 104.
33. See id. at 59, 104.
34. ld. at 39 (quoting 42 CONG. Q. 1841 (1984)).
35. 130 CONG. REC. 838 (1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
36. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 31 n.130 (citing J. Edgar Hoover, The Dire
Consequences of the Premature Release of Dangerous Criminals through Probation and Parole, 27
F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1(958).
37. Id.
38. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 38-48.
39. See Sheldon L. Messinger & Philip E. Johnson, California's Determinate Sentencing Statute:
History and Issues, in DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 13, 21-29 (1978); Tonry,
supra note i9, at 1248; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 38-77 (discussing the bipartisan
support for federal sentencing guidelines). Although much of the public discourse surrounding
determinate sentencing in the 197os and i98os focused on the federal system, see, e.g., FRANKEL, supra
note 26, at ix-x, arguments as to sentencing guidelines' functions and expected impacts also applied to
the states.
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improbable alliance of prisoners' rights and civil liberties groups, law-
and-order conservatives, and police unions.4° Legislation providing for
sentencing guidelines was often considered to be as much anti-crime as
anti-discrimination. Indeed, in many states, the guidelines legislation
itself explicitly states that crime reduction is a central goal.4' For
example, Tennessee's enabling statute states that the purpose of
sentencing guidelines is "to prevent crime and promote respect for the
law by... providing an effective deterrent to those likely to violate the
criminal laws of this state.42
However, this fundamental assumption that guidelines would reduce
crime rested on an empirical vacuum.43 No empirical evidence supported
the assumption.4 Indeed, it is perhaps surprising, given that crime
reduction was such a clear goal of most guidelines systems, that this
Article is the first to examine guidelines' impact on crime. Instead, much
of the support for the guidelines was based on guesses, not facts.45 These
commentators and legislators guessed wrong.
B. THE HISTORY OF STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
First developed during the late 1970s and early i98os, sentencing
guidelines currently apply both in the federal courts and in eighteen
states and the District of Columbia. 6 Table i lists the states and the years
of adoption. As of May 2005, at least six other states were also
considering sentencing guidelines: Alabama, Georgia, Massachusetts,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.47 Seven other states-
Connecticut, Maine, Texas, Colorado, Nevada, New York, and
Montana-have decided, after consideration, against guidelines.48
40. See Messinger and Johnson, supra note 39.
41. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-102 (2005).
42. Id. § 40-35-102(3). Louisiana, Oregon, and Washington likewise cite public safety as a
primary concern of guidelines. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 17, at 39-41 (listing the
purposes of guidelines in individual states' enabling legislation).
43. See generally Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413,437-50 (1992).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 17, at 28; WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., URBAN
INSTITUrE JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN
STATES' SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS II (2002); Frase, supra note It, at 1196.
47. See Frase, supra note I1, at 1197. For a thorough discussion of the current state of guidelines
systems, the history of state sentencing guidelines, and the similarities and differences between
systems, see id. at I 194-12o8.
48. Id. at I197.
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TABLE I. IMPLEMENTATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES SYSTEM
STATE YEAR IMPLEMENTED
Arkansas 1994
Delaware 1987
Florida 1983
Kansas 1993
Louisiana 1992
Maryland 1983
Michigan 1981
Minnesota 198o
Missouri 1997
North Carolina 1994
Ohio 1996
Oregon 1989
Pennsylvania 1982
Tennessee 1989
Utah 1993
Virginia '991
Washington 1984
Wisconsin 1985
States have created the guidelines in two ways.49 In some states, the
courts have created the guidelines, appointing committees of judges for
the purpose." Other states have created sentencing commissions, with
members representing judges, prosecutors, defenders, law enforcement
officials, correctional officials, the public, and sometimes even the
legislature itself.'
Sentencing guidelines require or recommend that offenders be
sentenced within a specific range of sentences, depending on the
seriousness of their offense and prior criminal history.2 Most state
guidelines systems have a sentencing matrix, similar to the following
matrix for the State of Washington, that allows judges to easily find the
sentencing range based on the offense and prior record:5 3
49. See Parent et al., supra note 17, at 2.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Frase, supra note II, at I 194-I2O6.
53. The numbers in this table are from the Washington State Sentencing Grid for crimes
committed after July 24, 1999. See STATE OF WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, ADULT
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2000), available at http://www.sgc.wa.gov/PUBS/PastManuals/
Manual_2ooo/2oooManualSectionI.pdf. The actual table is huge, including several different offenses
and prior record scores. See id. Detailed instructions tell judges how to compute prior record scores
and offense levels. See id. at 1-8 to -18. There are also instructions for required enhancements to the
sentencing ranges, such as drug-related enhancements and deadly weapon enhancements. See id.
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TABLE 2. SAMPLE OF WASHINGTON SENTENCING MATRIX
PRIOR RECORD SCORE
0 1 2 3 4 5
EXAMPLE1OENSPES SENTENCES IN MONTHSOFFENSES
Assault i 93-123 102-136 111-147 120-i6o 129-171 138-184
Robbery I 31-41 36-48 41-54 46-61 51-68 57-75
Burglary I 15-20 21-27 26-34 31-41 36-48 41-54
Although the general idea is the same among guidelines systems,
there are substantial differences among systems. 4 Importantly, they
differ in how strongly they constrain judges, in the degree to which
judges are forced to comply with the guidelines.5 Guidelines that
constrain judges' sentencing tightly might be expected to have a greater
impact than guidelines that are merely advisory. The National Center for
State Courts has arranged thirteen states along a voluntary/mandatory
continuum based on the extent to which their sentencing guidelines were
considered mandatory.: Table 3 presents the arrangement of states along
the continuum. The darker the shading, the greater the extent to which a
state's sentencing system is mandatory.
54. Many authors have discussed similarities and differences. See, e.g., Frase, supra note iI, at
1196-1205; Parent et al., supra note 17, at 2-3.
55. See, e.g., Parent et al., supra note 17, at 2-3.
56. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, SENTENCING DIGEST:
EXAMINING CURRENT SENTENCING ISSUES AND POLICIES II (1998). The ranking in the continuum is
based on guidelines systems in 1997 and considers issues such as when guidelines forms should be
completed, when judges must review guidelines, how compliance or departures are handled, and what
appellate rights are retained by the defense or prosecution. See id. In the original study, five states that
use guidelines systems were not listed in the continuum: Tennessee, Maryland, Michigan, Louisiana,
and Wisconsin. See id. I added these to the relevant location along the continuum based on the
guidelines characteristics from the original study.
[Vol. 58:533
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TABLE 3. THE VOLUNTARY/MANDATORY CONTINUUM OF STATE
GUIDELINES SYSTEMS
STATE ]DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE WITH GUIDELINES
Florida
Kansas
Minnesota
Ohio Departures allowed with written justification
Oregon from judge and subject to appeal
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Washington
Arkansas
Delaware
Louisiana Departures allowed with written justification
Maryland from judge, but no appellate review of
Michigan sentences
Utah
Virginia
Wisconsin
Missouri Judges may depart from guidelines at theirdiscretion
At one extreme, North Carolina requires compliance within
presumptive, aggravated, or mitigated ranges; no departures are allowed
beyond these ranges. At the other extreme, Missouri grants judges broad
discretion to depart from the guidelines, with no need even to explain
departures and no appeals of them. In eight other states, Arkansas,
Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Utah, Virginia, and
Wisconsin, guidelines are somewhat less voluntary. Although departures
from the guidelines are not subject to appeal, judges must provide
written reasons for departures. In the remaining eight states, Florida,
Kansas, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Washington, reasons for departures must be written, and they are subject
to appellate review.
As might be expected, studies have shown that judicial compliance
with the guidelines tends to be higher the more mandatory a state's
guidelines. Sentences that depart from the guidelines are more frequent
in voluntary states than in mandatory states, although compliance rates
are still substantial in many of the voluntary states. 7
57. See Frase, supra note ii, at 1198-i999 for an excellent discussion. Because of other informal
mechanisms, some small differences exist in the compliance that is required by the states within each
of the four categories. For example, Pennsylvania requires departure rates for each judge to be made
public. Id. at 1199. In Virginia, where trial court judges must be reappointed by the legislature,
February 2007]
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II. THE THEORY: PREDICTED CONSEQUENCES OF
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Contrary to the beliefs of sentencing guidelines' original proponents,
theory offers several divergent predictions about the impact of guidelines
on crime. In this Part, I present six theories, all based on well-tested
economic principles, about the relationship between guidelines and
reduced judicial discretion and crime. First, I introduce the general
economic model of crime. I next develop an economic model of the
distribution of types of criminals. Applying the model to sentencing
guidelines, I then present four theories that explain why guidelines may
increase crime, followed by two competing theories that explain why
guidelines may cause crime to decline. All six are only theories. My later
empirical analysis tests the theories.
A. THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF CRIME
First developed by Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker in 1968, the
economic model of crime"8 has become one of the primary models for
analyzing criminal behavior. Its success is due not only to its ability to
provide testable predictions about the effect of alternative criminal
policies on crime rates and other policy values, but also because its
predictions often prove correct. 9
The economic model of crime is based on the theory that many
people, including at least some criminals, behave rationally by
responding to incentives and weighing costs and benefits.6° It predicts
that many people will tend to refrain from an action if the costs of the
action exceed the benefits.6' This includes criminals: at least some
criminals will choose not to commit a crime for which costs exceed
benefits.
The costs and benefits of a crime are defined broadly, and can be
different for each potential criminal.62 Possible costs that potential
criminals may consider include direct costs, such as for acquiring criminal
compliance rates were 79% in 2003. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715,
795 (2005).
58. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968). Becker won the Nobel Prize in part for the development of the economic model of crime. See
Press Release, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, This Year's Laureate Has Extended the Sphere
of Economic Analysis to New Areas of Human Behavior and Relations (Oct. 13, 1992), available at
http:/Inobelprize.org/noble-prizes/economicslaureates/ 9 9 2/press.html.
59. Examples of the application of this model include Samuel Cameron, The Economics of Crime
Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence. 41 KYKLOS 301 (1988); Issac Ehrlich, Crime,
Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, so J. EcoN. PERSP. 43 (1996); Erling Eide, Economics of
Criminal Behavior, in V ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 345, 355-64 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).
6o. See Becker, supra note 58, at 179-98.
6s. Id. at 207-08.
62. Id.
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tools such as guns, flashlights, or lock-picking equipment." Costs also
include the expected penalty if convicted of the crime weighted by the
probability of being caught and convicted; a harsh penalty may be of less
concern if the criminal knows that there is little chance of being caught.
64
Other costs include the value of the time away from friends and family
while in prison, loss of income while incarcerated, the psychological cost
to the criminal of violating his own moral opposition to particular crimes,
the cost to the criminal of the shame of violating cultural or communityS• 65enfs
values, and decreased job prospects after conviction. Possible benefits
that potential criminals may consider include, among others, the value of
the loot acquired in a crime, the psychic benefit received from the crime
if the criminal enjoys his work, the thrill of risk-taking behavior if the
criminal enjoys risk, and respect and even fame to be gained from both
other criminals and the public for a crime well done. 66
The economic model of crime can explain why people with certain
characteristics tend to become criminals. For example, the model
predicts that less-educated people with low incomes will be more likely
to commit crime. Compared to a high-paid lawyer with an educational
pedigree, an unemployed homeless person has little to lose if she
shoplifts some food, is caught, and imprisoned. Moreover, the homeless
person's benefits from the crime may be relatively high if she is at
starvation's door. With lower costs and higher benefits, it is more likely
that the benefits of crime will exceed the costs, so more people with low
incomes and little education will commit crimes. Increased penalties such
as prison sentences or fines may increase the costs of crime for some
people, deterring them from committing crimes because the higher costs
now exceed the benefits. 67
Not every criminal must act rationally by weighing the costs and
benefits of crime in order for the economic model of crime to generate
accurate predictions. If even a small subset of criminals responds to
incentives, crime will decrease when the costs of crime, such as prison
63. See Ehrlich, supra note 59, at 46.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. The economic model of crime helps us to understand not only premeditated crimes, but also
spontaneous crimes. As a leading treatise notes:
In the case of premeditated crimes, the economic model may correspond to the actual
reasoning process of the criminal. In the case of spontaneous crimes, where there is no
deliberation, the economic model may nevertheless be understood as an account of the
criminal's behavior but not of his reasoning. For spontaneous crimes, criminals may not
actually reason as in the economic model, but they may act as if they had. By saying that
criminals act "as if" they had deliberated, we mean that, when presented with the
opportunity to commit crimes, they respond immediately to benefits and risks as if they had
weighed them.
Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW & EcONOMICs 463 (2004).
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sentences, increase. This is true even if most potential criminals do not
respond to the incentives.
That most criminals will have limited information about the costs
and benefits of crime, and hence, will not be able to weigh them
perfectly, is not fatal to the model. Studies show that, when information
is limited, criminals use what has recently happened in their vicinity to
themselves, acquaintances, and others as reported in the mass media to
form perceptions about severity of penalties and the probability of
detection. Although perceptions will not be exact, for many criminals,
they will be good approximations of the true costs and benefits of crime.
For example, their own driving experience, discussions with friends, and
local news reports give many drivers quite clear information about how
fast they can drive, and where, and still avoid a speeding ticket.
The value of a model depends on how accurately it predicts actual
behavior. Many articles demonstrate that the economic model of crime
often predicts behavior well. The studies show that, as required for the
economic model's predictions to be accurate, at least some criminals
behave rationally, or as if they were rational, and respond to incentives.
69
For example, Professor Steven Levitt studied increases in police forces
during mayoral and gubernatorial elections, and found that increases in
the likelihood of arrest caused by more police reduced both violent and
property crime.7° Likewise, a famous study by Professor Isaac Ehrlich
used data on robbery for the entire United States and found that, after
controlling for other factors, the likelihood of conviction and the average
sentence length were inversely related to the robbery rate."'
Many studies also show that criminals respond to changes in both
the length of prison sentences and the probability of imprisonment.72 For
68. See, e.g., Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime, 99 J. OF POL.
EcON. 1272, 1274-75 (T991). Articles on the economics of crime routinely assume that criminals form
expectations in this way. See, e.g., id. Instead of following a cohort of criminals to determine the true
probabilities of arrest, conviction, death row, and execution, the studies assume that criminals use
information from current and recent periods to estimate these probabilities. See, e.g., id.
69. Id.
70. See Steven Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on
Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 271, 279-84 (I997).
71. Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: .A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation, 81 J. POE. ECON. 531, 559-60 (973); accord PATRICIA MAYHEW ET AL., HOME OFFICE
RESEARCH UNIT, CRIME IN PUBLIC VIEW (1979); Jeff Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity, 29 EcoN. INQUIRY
297 (1991); Thomas Marvell & Carlisle Moody, Police Levels, Crime Rates, and Specification
Problems, 34 CRIMINOLOOY 609 (1996); Thomas Marvell & Carlisle Moody, Prison Population Growth
and Crime Reduction, 10 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1994); Helen Tauchen et al., Criminal
Deterrence: Revisiting the Issue with a Birth Cohort, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 399 (1994).
72. See Ehrlich, supra note 59, at 62; see also BERND-JOACHIM SCHULLER, EKONOMI OCH
KRIMINALITET: EN EMPIRISK UNDERSOKING AV BRoTTSLIGHETEN I SVERIGE, ECONOMISKA STUDIER UTGIVNA
AV NATIONALEKONOMISKA INSTITUTIONEN VID G6TEBORGS UNIVERSrrET [ECONOMICS AND CRIMINALITY:
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN SWEDEN] (1986); PETER SCHMIDT & ANN D. WITTE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE: THEORY, METHODS, AND APLICATIONS 194-216 (1984); Samuel L. Myers,
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example, Professor Kenneth Wolpin studied data from England and
Wales over the length period 1894-1967 and found that crime rates
decreased as the likelihood and severity of punishment increased.73
Likewise, Professor Ann Witte followed the post-release behavior of 641
convicted criminals for three years and found that, after controlling for
other factors, both higher likelihoods of conviction and imprisonment
and longer prison terms reduced recidivism among the offenders.74 Other
studies have found that the probability of punishment is more
important.75
B. A MODEL OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL TYPES
The economic model of crime suggests a distribution of criminal
types. Some people are low-risk criminals. They rarely, if ever, commit
offenses because their values, morals, social groups, legitimate earning
opportunities, and other factors make crime's costs exceed its benefits in
most situations. However, when the payoff from crime is high enough
(the benefits) -or when the likelihood of detection or penalty if detected
are low enough (the costs)-these people commit crimes. An example
might be a diligent college student who used cocaine for the first time
under peer pressure from her friends at a party just before police
knocked on the door.
These low-risk criminals are relatively easy to deter and have low
recidivism rates. Because they are not committed to lives of crime and
have many other opportunities, a relatively low penalty or likelihood of
detection might easily deter them.
At the other extreme are high-risk criminals: people prone to crime.
Their lack of legitimate earning opportunities and various social factors
combine to make criminal activity probable. Moreover, these criminals
are difficult to deter and have high recidivism rates because their other
options are limited. For example, a member of a violent drug gang who is
a high-school dropout and who has already served a long prison sentence
for murder has few legitimate earning opportunities. Indeed, even
Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employment versus Punishment Effects, 98 Q.J. ECON. 157
(1983); Bjorn Wahlroos, On Finnish Property Criminality: An Empirical Analysis of the Post War Era
Using an Ehrlich Model, 83 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF ECON. 553 (198i); Kenneth Wolpin, A Time Series-
Cross Section Analysis of International Variation in Crime and Punishment, 62 REV. EcON. & STAT. 417
(1980).
73. Kenneth I. Wolpin, An Economic Analysis of Crime and Punishment in England and Wales,
1894-1967,86 J. POL. ECON. 81S, 816, 837-39 (1978).
74. Ann Dryden Witte, Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data, 94 Q-J.
ECON. 57, 79-82 (1980).
75. See, e.g:, Dale 0. Cloninger & Lester Sartorius, Crime Rates, Clearance Rates and
Enforcement Effort: The Case of Houston, Texas, 38 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 389, 389 (1979); Grogger,
supra note 7I; Daniel Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal
Sanction Threats Into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 865-
70(2001).
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considering the risk of further imprisonment, crime might pay better
than the minimum-wage job that he would otherwise be lucky to get.
Moreover, his experience in prison may have hardened him to think of
crime as normal, and his peer group in his gang will be encouraging him
to commit further crime. Only large penalties or probabilities of
detection will deter such a high-risk criminal.
Figure i depicts a possible distribution of criminal types. The
horizontal axis arrays all criminals from left to right based on their
likelihood of resisting criminal activity either for the first time
(deterrability) or on subsequent occasions (recidivism). Low-risk
criminals who are easily deterred are on the left, high-risk criminals who
are difficult to deter are on the right, and average criminals are in the
middle. The horizontal axis also represents the minimum level of penalty
required to deter each type of offender. Low penalties will deter the low-
risk offenders on the left side. Only high penalties will deter the high-risk
offenders on the right. For the average offender in the middle, a
moderate penalty will do.
The area under each part of the distribution indicates the proportion
of offenders of each type. Because I have arbitrarily presented the
distribution in the familiar bell shape, it suggests that many criminals
have average levels of recidivism and deterrability. Smaller proportions
of offenders are at the extremes: the low-risk criminals and the high-risk
criminals. However, it is also possible that the distribution is not bell
shaped. The nature of the distribution does not affect my analysis.76
76. For example, it is possible, if not probable, that most offenders are low-risk criminals who
rarely commit crimes, and that there are very few high-risk criminals. If this is the case, the true
distribution of criminal types may be a decreasing distribution: the greatest proportion of offenders is
at the left side of the distribution, and the proportion of criminals decreases until the smallest
proportion lies at the extreme of high-risk criminals. If the true distribution of criminal types is indeed
characterized by this decreasing distribution, the predictions of this section do not change. Indeed,
they become even stronger. I present a bell-curve, or "normal" distribution, only because it is familiar
to many people.
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FIGURE I. DISTRIBUTION OF OFFENDERS BY RECIDIVISM AND
DETERRABILITY
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Level of Penalty Required to Deter
Prior to sentencing guidelines, judges had much discretion over
sentences.77 If judges could tailor sentences to a level that exactly
corresponded to the minimum level of penalty required to deter the
different types of defenders, society could achieve efficient deterrence
without wasting resources on excessive penalties. Judges could impose
short sentences or intermediate sanctions on low-risk offenders to the
left of Figure I, long sentences on high-risk offenders, and moderate
sentences on the average offenders in the middle; recall that the
horizontal axis indicates the minimum sentence necessary to deter each
offender. If existing studies are correct and criminals form expectations
of sentence length based on what similar types of criminals have
received,78 then, as would be optimal, low-risk criminals would expect
short sentences and high-risk criminals would expect long sentences.
If judges tailored sentences in this way, then indeterminate
sentencing could create perfect deterrence at minimum cost. All
criminals would be deterred. None would stay in prison longer than
necessary. Costs to the criminal would be minimized; each criminal
would be exiled from his society, family, and job for the minimum
necessary period to create deterrence. Society's costs would also be
minimized. Taxpayers would pay for the necessary period of
77. Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions of
Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 23I, 233 (2004).
78. See, e.g., Sah, supra note 68, at 1274.
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incarceration but no longer. Low-risk criminals would not be
transformed unnecessarily into high-risk ones by excessive sentences.
For indeterminate sentencing to succeed in this way, judges must
have two characteristics. First, they must have the ability to evaluate each
defendant and determine the minimum sentence that would deter.
Second, they must impose that sentence by focusing on crime control,
rather than permitting other factors to influence the sentences. These
assumptions may not be true always, or even most of the time; indeed,
the later empirical analysis in this Article will permit exploration of the
assumptions. For example, some proponents of sentencing guidelines
argued that some judges' sentencing practices were guided, not by
considerations of justice and deterrence, but by individual defendant's
characteristics, including gender, education, income, and race.79
Nevertheless, it is certainly a reasonable hypothesis-which I will
test-that the assumptions are true for at least some judges. Many judges
view crime control as an important goal of sentencing, and they are
proud of their ability to exploit their unique vantage point to be able to
make wise judgments about the defendant's deterrability and tendency
to recidivism. Indeed, judges' main objection to sentencing guidelines is
that guidelines prevent them from using this expertise. s' For example,
one judge has expressed regret that the guidelines both spurn judges'
skill and experience in evaluating deterrability and discard the
knowledge about the defendant that the judge gains during the
proceedings.8Z
In a survey by the Federal Judicial Center in 1996, approximately
8o% of district and appellate judges thought that judges should be given
more discretion than permitted under the guidelines." In a 2000 survey of
federal court judges, 45% of the responding judges said that the federal
guidelines were too inflexible. 84 Indeed, many judges are so outraged at
sentencing guidelines that they have decided to take senior status early
79. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 113-
35 (2004) (discussing several studies finding discrimination in sentencing).
8o. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 15, at 243-44; Harlington Wood, Jr., Panel Remarks: Is "Relevant
Conduct" Relevant? Reconsidering the Guidelines' Approach to Real Offense Sentencing, 44 ST. LouIs
U. L.J. 418, 418-21 (2000). *
81. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 15, at 243-44; Wood, supra note 8o, at 419-20.
82. See Wood, supra note 8o, at 420.
83. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & Scorlr A. GILBERT, THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S 1996 SURVEY 6 tbl.4 (1997), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/gssurvey.pdf/$file/gssurvey.pdf.
84. See Michael Edmund O'Neill, Surveying Article III Judges' Perspectives On the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 15 FED. SENT. REP. 215, 215-6 (2003), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/judsurv.htm (describing how the survey was sent to all active Article III
judges, and how one-half of the district court judges and one-third of the appellate judges responded.).
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to avoid sentencing with such limited discretion.5
If at least some judges can successfully identify a defendant's
deterrability, then, before guidelines were adopted, some sentences were
the minimum penalty needed to deter future criminal acts, preventing
recidivism by the defendant and deterring other similar criminals. In
doing this, these judges efficiently imposed very mild sentences for low-
risk criminals and harsh sentences for high-risk criminals. I call these
efficient differences in sentences "productive disparity."
Sentencing guidelines change sentencing significantly; the guidelines
in practice do indeed constrain judges and cause them to impose
816different sentences than without the guidelines. Indeed, that is why
many judges dislike guidelines so vehemently. Studies show that
sentencing guidelines have two main impacts. First, they reduce
sentences' variability, decreasing the number of very high and very low
sentences. Second, as the guidelines' law-and-order supporters hoped,
they increase the average sentence for many crimes, especially violent
crimes. 8, With the majority of states adopting truth-in-sentencing reforms
before or during this period, the higher average sentences translate into
longer time served in prison.88
Figure 2 shows these changes. In addition to showing the same
distribution of criminal types and penalty that would deter each type as
in Figure i, Figure 2 depicts the guidelines system's narrower range of
sentences and higher average sentence. In states with strict mandatory
guidelines systems, the guidelines' sentencing range would be narrower.
In states with voluntary systems, the range would be wider. However, if,
in a voluntary state, the guidelines influenced even one judge's
sentencing of even one defendant, then the guidelines' sentencing range
would be narrower than the range without the guidelines.
85. See Boylan, supra note 77, at 251 ("[T]he sentencing guidelines have led district court judges
to select senior status earlier. Specifically, judges take senior status after .4 years instead of after 3
years of eligibility.").
86. In addition to the explicit ranges required or recommended by the guidelines, guidelines also
create new grounds on which judges can be reversed. As the threat of reversal is a major incentive for
judges, it further reduces judicial discretion. For a discussion of judicial incentives in another area of
law, see Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L. J. io5 0995).
87. PAULA M. DITrON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT:
TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 7-9 (999).
88. Id.
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FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF OFFENDERS BY RECIDIVISM AND
DETERRABILITY: THE CASE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES
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I now develop several theories of how the distribution of criminal
types and the impacts of sentencing guidelines will affect crime.
C. THEORIES OF GUIDELINES' IMPACTS ON CRIME
Consideration of both the distribution of criminal types and
sentencing guidelines' impacts suggests six competing theories about how
guidelines might affect crime. First, I present four theories that explain
how guidelines might increase crime. These theories all suggest a trade-
off between uniformity and deterrence: under these theories, stricter
guidelines produce more crime, and vice versa. I follow with two theories
that suggest why guidelines might cause crime instead to decrease.
Although this Part offers occasional anecdotal evidence to support
the theories, the theories remain at the section's end unproven. Indeed
each theory's predictions could be true in different situations and for
different criminal types. Sentencing guidelines' net effect on crime will
depend on the actual sizes of the impacts from the mechanisms in each of
the theories. Only the empirical analysis in the following part will suggest
which of the two groups of theoretical predictions are the most
important.
i. Theories Suggesting that Guidelines Might Increase Crime
a. Shorter Sentences for High-Risk Criminals may Decrease
Deterrence
Crime may increase after sentencing guidelines if the guidelines
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prevent judges from imposing the necessary severe penalties on the
highest-risk criminals. Suppose that a judge accurately believes that a
defendant is the type in the right tail of the distribution of criminal types
in Figures i and 2; that is, the defendant exhibits characteristics that
reveal to the judge that the defendant is a high-risk criminal. As shown in
both figures, deterrence of this criminal and others like him would
require a severe sentence.
However, suppose also that, although the characteristics are
apparent to the judge, they are not among the guidelines' approved
aggravating factors that would permit the judge to increase the sentence
to the necessary high level for deterrence. That is, in Figure 2, the
necessary sentence is more severe than that permitted by the guidelines'
sentencing range.
The moderate penalty that the guidelines demand will not be severe
enough to deter this and other high-risk criminals from committing
further crimes. The guidelines prohibit the judge from punishing high-
risk criminals sufficiently to deter them. The guidelines will thus cause at
least some high-risk criminals to commit more crimes. That is, the lower
expected sentence decreases the costs of crime, causing the costs of crime
to be less than the benefits of crime for some high-risk offenders. This
may lead to more criminal acts.
Likewise, if other high-risk criminals learn that these high-risk
criminals have received lower sentences than before, then the other
criminals may begin to expect to receive lower sentences."' Some of them
too may commit more crimes.
It is unlikely that the guidelines will cause an offsetting decrease in
crime among low-risk criminals. If most judges were imposing pre-
guidelines sentences that were shorter, yet still sufficient to deter low-risk
criminals, then lengthening the sentences for low-risk criminals will not
increase deterrence of them. Instead, the guidelines produce the same
deterrence of low-risk criminals as before, but at a greater cost both to
the low-risk offenders who must endure the longer sentences and to the
public who must pay for longer imprisonment. The remorseful first-time
cocaine user who before would have received probation and been fully
deterred now wastes a year in an expensive prison. The next two sections
present two additional reasons why lengthening sentences for low-risk
criminals may not increase deterrence.
Indeed, in another context, Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner,
both of whom are leading scholars and federal appellate judges, confirm
that limiting judicial discretion reduces deterrence of high-risk criminals
89. Cf Sah, supra note 68, at 1274-75, 1277-78 (describing the factors that may influence a
potential criminal's perceptions of the risk of crime).
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without further deterring anyone else.' In his popular treatise, Judge
Posner indicates:
Broad sentencing discretion enables the judge to practice a form of
price discrimination that consists of deciding what penalty is optimal
given the particular characteristics of the defendant. If the defendant
seems to belong to a class of people who are easily deterrable, a light
sentence may suffice to deter him, and those like him, in the future; if
he is a hardened and inveterate criminal, a heavy sentence may be
necessary for this purpose. If these sentences are averaged together
and the same sentence given to each defendant, there will be less
deterrence; the heavier sentence will be wasted on the easily
deterrable, and the lighter sentence will underdeter the hardened
criminals.'
The theory in this subpart demonstrates the possible trade-off
between deterrence and uniformity in sentencing. The more uniform the
sentencing, the less deterrence, and the greater the unnecessary costs for
sentences that are longer than necessary for deterring low-risk offenders.
In contrast, the greater the productive disparity that the system permits
judges to impose, the higher the deterrence and the lower the
unnecessary imprisonment costs.
When sentencing a high-risk criminal, the judge might attempt to
circumvent the guidelines by seeking to impose a sentence above the
guidelines sentencing range. In states with voluntary guidelines, judges
will be able to do this more readily than in states whose guidelines are
mandatory. Thus, we should expect greater increases in crime in states
with mandatory guidelines.
Even in states with voluntary guidelines, judges will have relative
difficulty in imposing sentences that exceed the guidelines'
recommendation. In contrast to the opposite situation in which a judge
avoids the guidelines by either acquitting or imposing a shorter sentence
than the guidelines recommend, defendants will fight longer sentences
strenuously. Defendants' fierce opposition might be expected to reduce
the occurrence of sentencing above the guidelines' range; perhaps
because judges fear reversal on appeal. Accordingly, studies show that
judges are much more likely to impose sentences that are shorter than
those suggested by the guidelines than they are to impose sentences that
are longer than the guidelines' recommendations.92
This theory assumes that at least some judges can identify a
defendant's likelihood of recidivism in ways that sentencing guidelines
cannot. Judges certainly believe that they can do this-for example, by
9o. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 579-580 (2003); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289,325-28 (1983).
91. POSNER, supra note 90, at 58o.
92. See, e.g., JOHN W. O'BRIEN ET AL., 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON
SENTENCING 16 (1986).
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observing the defendant's demeanor. Indeed, we have seen that
guidelines' constraining of judges' discretion in sentencing is a main
reason why so many judges detest guidelines. 3
All judges may not be able to always discern each defendant's
deterrability and perfectly tailor sentences. Nevertheless, it is not
unreasonable to assume that at least some judges sometimes may be able
to identify characteristics that the guidelines do not consider, but that
nevertheless relate to recidivism and deterrability.94 For example, a judge
may conclude that a criminal is high risk because he exhibits a
threatening attitude, a lack of remorse, or a lack of cooperation at trial.9"
However, in many states the guidelines prohibit a judge from considering
these characteristics in sentencing. Crime increases because the
guidelines prevent the judge from using her unique ability to identify
high-risk criminals to fashion appropriately-severe penalties.
Leading commentators, from both academia and the bench, have
noted the large costs in abandoning the previous sentencing system of
individual evaluation by judges, replacing it instead with guidelines'
group sentencing. For example, Professor Richard Frase has identified
the harms when guidelines systems make assessments of deterrability
and likelihood of recidivism "on the basis of group or actuarial risk,
rather than individualized, case-by-case diagnoses." Likewise, Oregon
Judge Michael Marcus has long opposed the reduced discretion under
sentencing guidelines. He notes, "offenders for whom public safety is
best achieved by disparate dispositions ... should be treated differently.
That an identical crime can be committed by a psychopath or by an
addict susceptible to recovery (with equal criminal histories) does not
compel identical dispositions as a matter of fairness.""
The Florida legislature recognized the consequences of preventing
judges from giving severe penalties to the most high-risk offenders when,
in 1995, it abolished limits in the Florida sentencing guidelines on
sentencing severity. 98 Judges in Florida now have discretion to impose
93. See O'Neill, supra note 84, at 215-16; supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
94. Although some judges may be better at determining a defendant's deterrability, others may
be worse than the guidelines. If, on average, judges are better than the guidelines, then the theoretical
predictions in this section would hold.
95. For a discussion of why remorse should not be considered in sentencing, see generally Martha
Grace Duncan, "So Young and So Untender": Remorseless Children and the Expectations of the Law,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (2002).
96. Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guidelines, 44
ST. Louis U. L.J. 425, 433-34 (2000).
97. Marcus, supra note 15, at 245; accord Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Handcuffing the
Sentencing Judge: Are Offender Characteristics Becoming Irrelevant? Are Congressionally Mandated
Sentences Displacing Judicial Discretion?, 2 FED. SENT'G REP. I89, 191 (1989).
98. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal Courts: A
Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SEr'G REP. 69,70 (1999).
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any sentence between the guidelines' recommended minimum term and
the statutory maximum." No longer do the guidelines impose a
recommended maximum term falling between these.'"'
The recognition that productive sentencing disparity may increase
deterrence and may eliminate unnecessary imprisonment costs suggests
that we reexamine the sentencing disparity that was a major reason for
sentencing guidelines' adoption. Although much of the pre-guidelines
disparity may have been based on bigoted race and sex discrimination,"'
it is possible that some of the apparently-discriminatory disparity was
instead based on offender deterrability or likelihood of recidivism. For
example, many of the claims of discrimination that led to sentencing
guidelines were based on sentencing disparities between men and
women I°2 and between whites and African-Americans.'" No doubt some
of this disparity may have been caused by racism and sexism.
However, some of the disparity may have represented judges'
conscientious attempt to impose harsher sentences on those with the
greatest probability of recidivism. The recidivism rate of men is much
higher than that of women, and the recidivism rate of black criminals is
much higher than that of white criminals.'" Moreover, men and black
criminals also violate the conditions of their parole at a much higher rate
than women and white criminals, respectively. 5 For a judge to base
sentencing decisions on race or gender would be immoral, illegal, and
impermissible. It would also be immoral, illegal, and impermissible for a
judge to give longer sentences to men and blacks merely because these
two groups have high recidivism rates.
However, in more men and blacks than women and whites, judges
may have correctly identified the characteristics, other than gender and
race, suggesting a danger of recidivism. That is, judges may have, on
average, imposed longer sentences on men and blacks because men and
blacks more frequently display the characteristics that suggest recidivism:
because men and blacks are disproportionately recidivists, they may
99. Id.
ioo. Id.
Ioi. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 79.
102. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATrERS 54 (1996).
io3. See, e.g., PAUL L. SUTTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING:
PERSPECTIVES OF ANALYSES AND A DESIGN FOR RESEARCH 5 (978); Thorston Sellin, Race Prejudice in
the Administration of Justice, 41 AM. J. SoC. 212 (1935).
104. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 7 (2oo2), available
at http://ojp/usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr.pdf (finding that men were more likely than women to be
rearrested (68.4% versus 57.6%), reconvicted (47.6% versus 39.9%), and resentenced to prison
(26.2% versus 17.3%); also finding that black criminals were more likely than white criminals to be
rearrested (72.9% versus 62.7%), reconvicted (51.1% versus 43.3%), and resentenced to prison
(28.5% versus 22.6%)).
105. See id. (finding the following parole violation rates: men, 53.0%; women, 39.4%; black, 54.2%;
white, 49.9%).
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disproportionately reveal this to judges. Employers seldom grant
pregnancy leave to men not because of gender discrimination, but
because men cannot become pregnant.' °6 Similarly, judges may have
sometimes imposed longer prison sentences on men not because they
were men, but because men exhibit signals of recidivism more often than
women.
States' guidelines systems use objective factors to attempt to tailor
penalties to offenders' deterrability and likelihood of recidivism."'° For
example, because criminals with longer criminal histories are likely to be
less-deterrable, guidelines typically consider criminal history to be an
aggravating factor that increases recommended sentences."8 Some states
have tried to tailor guidelines sentences to recidivism more directly. For
example, the Ohio and Virginia guidelines list factors that show an
increased likelihood of recidivism, and they permit judges to consider the
factors in sentencing."
However, judges may be able to detect indicators of deterrability
that guidelines miss. Criminal histories and lists of objective factors may
not capture all differences in deterrability. For example, even the least-
deterrable offenders have a first-time conviction. Moreover, the judge
can effectively evaluate the defendant's behavior during the prosecution
and trial.
There is some evidence that suggests that guidelines have indeed
reduced the opportunity for effective judges to tailor some sentences to
offender deterrability and likelihood of recidivism. In 1994, the Bureau
of Justice Statistics (BJS) conducted an extensive study of recidivism of
state prisoners."' Although the BJS presented only the raw data and
tested no hypotheses,"' my own quick analysis shows that recidivism
rates were significantly higher in states with sentencing guidelines
systems than in non-guidelines states."' These results suggest that
guidelines states that limit judicial discretion may prevent judges from
imposing sentences severe enough to deter the offenders with the highest
likelihood of recidivism.
lo6. Employers' frequent refusal to grant paternity leave may be based on gender discrimination.
107. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.I2(D) (LexisNexis 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803(5)
to (6) (2003).
IQ8. See, e.g., MARVIN WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 162 tbl.Io.3 (1972).
109. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29 29 .12(D); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.i-803(5)-(6).
1IO. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcs, supra note 104.
11I. See id.
112. Of course, this relationship could be caused by states with high recidivism rates being more
likely to enact sentencing guidelines. Cf BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 1O4, at 12 (finding
rearrest rates in guidelines states averaged 59%, compared to 55% in non-guidelines states in a cohort
of 272,111 former inmates from fifteen states (representing over two-thirds of the inmates released in
1994) tracked for three years after their release).
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b. Longer Sentences May Cause Circumvention of Guidelines
Crime may also increase if sentencing guidelines cause prosecutors,
judges, and juries to become less willing to prosecute or convict.
Guidelines prohibit judges from both reducing sentences below certain
thresholds and considering mitigating circumstances that many
guidelines do not specify, such as remorse, character, or demeanor at
trial."3 For example, Oregon's guidelines have been criticized for
ignoring an offender's degree of involvement in crime and whether the
crime is a product of psychopathy." '4
Not wanting to impose a long sentence on a seemingly low-risk
defendant, a prosecutor may decide not to prosecute, or a judge or jury
may dismiss charges or acquit."5 In most state court systems, the judge
does not inform the jury of the sentence that the defendant would
receive if convicted. ' 6 However, juries often learn informally of harsh
sentencing practices that guidelines impose, just as other potential
criminals learn of the harsh sentences. " ' For example, the public might
learn through news reports of draconian sentences for young drug users.
Indeed, tough-on-crime support for guidelines presumed public
knowledge; the community's awareness of the general nature of
sentences under guidelines is essential for the guidelines to deter
potential criminals.
Looking at this from the perspective of Figures i and 2, suppose that
a prosecutor, judge, or jury believes that a defendant is a low-risk
criminal in the distribution's left-most tail. Accordingly, a mild sentence
or intermediate sanction would be appropriate. However, in some
situations, guidelines systems prevent judges from imposing mild or
intermediate sanctions. If the sentencing guidelines require a much
harsher sentence than the appropriate mild sentence, then the prosecutor
might dismiss charges, or the judge or jury might acquit. For example,
recall the example of the diligent college student who was caught with
cocaine at a party. Suppose that the prosecutor, judge, or jury concludes
that a year of probation would be sufficient for deterrence of the
defendant and those like her. If sentencing guidelines demanded instead
a year-long prison sentence, then the prosecutor, judge, or jury might
dismiss or acquit. If the only choices are an excessive penalty under the
113. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 15, at 245.
114. See id.
115. Judicial acquittals are rare compared to charges resolved by plea bargains and jury trials.
Nevertheless, even rare judicial acquittals could affect potential offenders' expectations of their
likelihood of imprisonment.
116. Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory
Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1242 & n-59 (1995).
117. Id. at 1242 & n.63.
1i8. See Frase, supra note 96, at 44I.
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guidelines and no penalty, the prosecutor, judge, or jury might choose no
penalty.
If prosecutors, judges, or juries behave this way, then sentencing
guidelines should cause crime to increase. The penalties that the legal
system now applies to low-risk defendants will be milder than before the
guidelines were adopted. Deterrence will decline, and low-risk
defendants will commit more crime. Before the guidelines, the first-time
cocaine user might have been convicted and received probation. Under
this new paradigm, she receives no penalty at all for her first-time
cocaine use. Thus, perhaps she is more likely than she otherwise would
be to use cocaine again.
Other potential low-risk offenders may learn that, under such
sentencing guidelines, the low-risk offenders receive no punishment.
They too will be less deterred than they were before.
Strong evidence suggests that strict guidelines may both cause some
judges to be unwilling to convict and induce some prosecutors to charge
lesser crimes or even dismiss charges. Surveys of federal judges and many
federal judicial opinions demonstrate that many federal judges perceive
federal sentencing guidelines to be too harsh and inflexible."9 Although
federal guidelines impose stronger limits on judicial discretion than many
state systems, I refer first to the federal experience because federal
guidelines have received more scholarly attention than state guidelines."2
For example, Justice Kennedy has stated that federal sentencing
guidelines are too harsh and too lacking in judicial discretion.'2 Chief
Justice Rehnquist was also concerned that guidelines restricted necessary
sentencing discretion.'22 Circuit Judge Jose Cabranes and Professor Kate
Stith have concluded that guidelines are overly harsh and inappropriately
shift judicial discretion to legislators and probation officers.'23 In studies
that I have already mentioned, 8o% of federal judges in one study and
45% in another thought the guideless were too inflexible, and many
19. See, e.g., TREADWAY JOHNSON & GILBERT, supra note 83, at 6.
120. See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing
Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351,
1351-52 (2005).
121. See Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the American
Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/spo8-o9-o3.html ("The compromise that led to the guidelines led also to an
increase in the length of prison terms. We should revisit this compromise. The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines should be revised downward.").
122. See Bill Mears, Rehnquist Slams Congress Over Reducing Sentencing Discretion, CNN.coM,
Jan. 1, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2oo4/LAW/oi/oi/rehnquist.judiciary; see also Downward Departures
Debate Continues, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, Washington D.C.), Aug. 2003,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/augo3ttb/downward/index.html.
123. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24.
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judges avoided applying the guidelines by retiring early.'24
This dissatisfaction may sometimes induce judges to circumvent the
guidelines. As Professor Stith and Judge Cabranes note:
Many judges are not at ease operating within the system, and may be
sorely tempted to manipulate their Guidelines calculations to avoid the
results called for by the Guidelines. Where the Guidelines' mandated
sentencing range seems inadequate or too harsh, the judge may be
tempted to reconsider factual "findings" in order to alter the
Guidelines calculation, or to devise a basis for departure that may be
largely irrelevant to the culpability in the case at hand but at least may
pass muster in the court of appeals.' 5
Another federal judge was even more explicit: "The Guidelines...
have made charlatans and dissemblers of us all. We spend our time
plotting and scheming, bending and twisting, distorting and ignoring the
law in an effort to achieve a just result. All under the banner of truth in
sentencing!
' '116
Some state judges also admit to evading the system. In a series of
interviews with California municipal court judges, the judges admitted to
using "a variety of methods to expand their discretion, including refusing
plea bargains, assignment of offenders to probation and community
service, creative interpretation of statutes, and recommendations to the
probation department to allow alternative placements for mandatory
sentences."' 7
Most importantly, many studies provide empirical evidence that is
consistent with judges' evasion of the guidelines. S They find that both
124. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
125. SirrH & CABRANES, supra note 24; see also Andrew D. Leipold, Why are Federal Judges so
Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 207 (2005) (indicating that the guidelines "at times created a
tension between the judge's duty to follow the law and the duty to see that justice is done").
126. Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 365 (1992) (quoting an anonymous trial judge from the Eastern District of New
York); accord Frank 0. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade
of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1223 (2ooI) ("Anecdotal information and
conversations with lawyers and judges across the country suggest a creeping increase in the willingness
by all parties, lawyers and judges alike, to fudge the facts a little to achieve desired sentencing
outcomes.").
127. Jon'a Meyer & Paul Jesilow, The Formation of Judicial Bias in Sentencing: Preliminary
Findings on "Doing Justice", 22 W. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 279 (1995).
128. See Martin F. Kaplan & Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties Under the Control of Others Can
Reduce Guilty Verdicts, io L. &. PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 8 (1986) (acquittals are more likely when the judge
or jury has little control over the punishment required by a conviction; reasoning that judges and juries
want to be sure that appropriate sentences are imposed); Norbert L. Kerr, Severity of Prescribed
Penalty and Mock Jurors' Verdicts, 36 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1431, 1439 (1978) ("Increasing the
severity of the prescribed penalty for an offence resulted in an adjustment of subjects' conviction
criteria such that more proof of guilt was required for conviction and thus resulted in a reduced
probability of conviction."); Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their
Verdicts, 13 L. & Soc'y REV. 781, 793 (I979) (finding that acquittals are more likely when charged
offense is serious); Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions
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judges and juries are more likely to acquit as the punishment following a
conviction increases.'29 Moreover, the likelihood of acquittal is even
higher when judges and juries have little control over the punishment
required by a conviction, as in guidelines systems.'30
Evidence also shows that prosecutors sometimes attempt to evade
sentencing guidelines by undercharging.'3 ' Studies show that state
guidelines systems with little flexibility and narrow sentencing ranges
induce prosecutors to grant charge concessions.'32  For example,
researchers have noted that in the State of Washington, the "severity of
charges at conviction changed significantly following each change in the
[sentencing guidelines] law, which suggests the manipulation of charges
(and subsequent sentences) rather than a strict application of the charges
committed."'33
Likewise, interviews in Minnesota and Kansas also indicated that,
after the adoption of guidelines, prosecutors engaged in more charge
bargaining because of the inflexibility of sentencing ranges.'34 This was
especially true for low-level felonies, crimes likely committed by low-risk
offenders.'33 Similarly, studies have shown that federal prosecutors began
to engage in more charge bargaining after federal guidelines were
adopted.' 36 A i9i study by the Sentencing Commission determined that
"prosecutors and judges can and will sometimes evade mandatory
sentencing provisions when they seem unjust."'37
of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 211, 216 (0972) ("The present data indicate that
restricting the decision alternatives available to [mock] jurors, especially when the guilty alternative
has a consequence which is perceived to be too severe, may increase the likelihood of obtaining a not
guilty verdict.").
129. See sources cited supra note 128.
130. See James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the
Penalty Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. EcoN. 385 (99i) (presenting a model in which juries hoping to
avoid wrongful convictions are less likely to convict after sentencing guidelines are enacted) Kaplan &
Krupa, supra note 128 (concluding that judges and juries want to be sure that appropriate sentences
are imposed); Leipold, supra note 125, at 211 (finding that empirical evidence is consistent with the
theory that judges are less likely to convict under the guidelines).
131. See Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences after
Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 1O5 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 986 (2005)
(discussing the Engen/Steen study and their own interview evidence of charge bargaining under the
guidelines).
132. Rodney L. Engen & Sara Steen, The Power to Punish: Discretion and Sentencing Reform in
the War on Drugs, 1o5 Am. J. Soc. 1357, 1384 (2000).
133. Id.
134. See King et al., supra note 131, at 988-89.
135. Id. at 989 n.103.
136. See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study
of Charging and Bargaining Practices under the Federal Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 5O1 (1992);
Parent et al., supra note 17, at 4; Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period,
91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285, 1293 (1997); Tonry, supra note 17, at 2i.
137. Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity
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It is possible that prosecutors' undercharging will produce the same
sentence as before the guidelines, and, therefore, have no effect on
crime. If the prosecutor and judge believe that the guidelines' sentence
for the crime that the defendant has committed would be excessive given
the defendant's deterrability, they might attempt to circumvent the
guidelines. They might charge and convict the defendant of a lesser crime
the guidelines' sentence for which is the same as the milder sentence that
the judge would have chosen before .the guidelines. Deterrence and the
crime rate would remain the same because penalties have remained the
same.
Prosecutors' reduction of sentences below guidelines levels by
reduced charging would decrease the number of cases in which the judge
and jury are confronted with the choice of excessive sentencing under the
guidelines and acquittal. However, in most situations, this strategy is
unlikely to produce the same sentence as before the guidelines. It
requires the unlikely cooperation of prosecutor, judge, and jury in cases
that go to trial. In addition, some prosecutors and judges may respect
ethical rules and norms that prohibit undercharging. Moreover,
prosecutors may prefer, for political reasons, to obtain longer sentences
in order to show that they are tough on crime.
Thus, a substantial number of cases will still confront judges and
juries with this unfortunate choice between an unnecessarily harsh
sentence and acquittal. If acquittal is chosen in any of these cases, then
the effect of the guidelines could be to reduce deterrence and increase
crime.' Only empirical analysis will shed light on the degree to which
prosecutors' discretion in charging protects against guidelines' tendency
to increase crime.
c. Longer Sentences for Low-Risk Criminals May Increase
Recidivism
Although some prosecutors, judges, and juries will circumvent the
guidelines by acquitting or undercharging low-risk offenders, others will
not. As a result, guidelines will cause many low-risk offenders to be
sentenced to longer sentences. If before the guidelines judges were
already deterring these offenders with mild sentences, then the longer
sentences will not increase deterrence or reduce crime; low-risk
offenders were already deterred.
Instead, the longer sentences for low-risk offenders could instead
increase crime. An empirical study suggests that the longer the sentence,
the greater that the alienation, deteriorated family relations, and removal
and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, ii STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 99 (1999).
138. Even if the average sentence increases for offenders receiving a prison sentence, if more of
the offenders are acquitted, deterrence could decrease if the expected sentence (sentence length
multiplied by probability of receiving a sentence) decreases.
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from regular employment combine to reduce noncriminal alternatives;
the longer one's stay in prison, the more crime becomes a likely choice
that is available when one is released.
39
Moreover, prisons are boarding schools for crime. Imprisoning low-
risk offenders for longer periods increases the probability that the low-
risk offenders will learn from, and emulate, higher-risk offenders.'4" A
sadly effective way to learn to become a dedicated criminal is to spend
long periods of time with dedicated criminals.'4'
Studies suggest that milder penalties lower recidivism rates of low-
risk offenders.'42 For low-risk offenders, shorter sentences reduce crime
more than longer sentences, and sentences that do not include
imprisonment reduce crime more than prison sentences.'43
Because sentencing guidelines increase the frequency of
imprisonment and sentence lengths for low-risk defendants, guidelines
may cause recidivism rates for low-risk offenders to increase.
d. More Certain Sentences May Deter Fewer Offenders
Sentencing guidelines could also increase crime if criminals prefer
the reduced sentencing variability under the guidelines. Before
sentencing guidelines, sentencing confronted the offender with much risk
because the sentence that an offender might receive was relatively
uncertain. A judge could impose a sentence higher than the upper limit
of the later guidelines sentencing range. Or a lenient judge would impose
a very low sentence, below the lower guidelines limit.
Sentencing guidelines reduce this risk. The guidelines limit the range
139. See Miles D. Harer, Sentencing Goals for Low-Risk Offenders: Do Guideline Sentences for
Low-Risk Drug Traffickers Achieve their Stated Purposes?, 7 FED. SENT'G REP. 22, 23 (1994) ("[Logic
suggests that the alienation, deteriorated family relations, and reduced employment prospects
resulting from the extremely long removal from family and regular employment may well increase
recidivism.").
140. Grogger, supra note 71, at 304.
141. Id.
142. See PAULA SMITH ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF PRISON SENTENCES AND INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS ON
RECIDIVISM: GENERAL EFFECTS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 2002-01, at ii (2002) (examining the
effects of sanctions on recidivism), available at http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/corrections/
20020iGendreaue.pdf; Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation:
Policy, Practice, and Prospects, in 3 POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND DECISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 109-75 (2000) (discussing the failure of rehabilitation as a goal of criminal punishment). See
generally Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's
Promising, in RESEARCH IN BRIEF 1-2 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, NCJ 171676, r998) (arguing that properly
evaluating crime prevention programs requires scientific evaluation), available at
http://www.ncjrs.orglpdffiles/i7x676.pdf.
143. See PAUL GENDREAU ET AL., CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OF CANADA, THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNITY
SANCTIONS AND INCARCERATION ON RECIDIVISM, in COMPENDIUM OF EFFECTIVE CORRECTIONAL
PROGRAMMING (2000), available at http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/compendium/
2ooo/chap_3-e.shtml; PAUL GENDREAU ET AL., SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, THE EFFECTS OF PRISON
SENTENCES ON RECIDIVISM 9 (1999).
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of acceptable sentences, and reduce the possibility of receiving either a
very high or a very low sentence. Individual states have conducted pre-
and post-guidelines evaluations of sentencing practices that confirm that
the guidelines have achieved their goal of reducing sentencing variance.
For example, the sentencing guidelines greatly reduced the
variability of sentence lengths in Minnesota.'" Before the guidelines,
only 62% of sentences had fallen within what the guidelines later
established as the recommended range.'45 After the guidelines, 79% of
sentences were within the recommended range., 6 Guidelines also greatly
reduced sentence variation in Pennsylvania.'47 Before the guidelines, only
25% of aggravated assault sentences, 51% of burglary sentences, 22% of
rape sentences, and 43% of robbery sentences fell within the
recommended sentencing range.'4  After the guidelines, 67% of
aggravated assaults, 78% of burglaries, 70% of rapes, and 8I% of
robberies were within the recommended range. 4
9
Likewise, the 1983 Washington guidelines caused sentence-length
variability to decrease by 6o%. The variability of Oregon's sentence
lengths was reduced by 45% after the imposition of the guidelines.'5 °
North Carolina's sentencing guidelines have also led to a decrease in the
variability of sentencing decisions."'
Most noncriminals are "risk-averse;" that is, they dislike risk. They
would prefer a loss with certainty to a gamble with the same "expected
value" as the certain loss. For example, risk aversion is the basis for the
entire insurance industry. Suppose that the chance of a $ioo,ooo house
burning down was I% each year, so that the expected loss was .oi x
$ioo,ooo, or $iooo. Most people are willing to pay much more than $iooo
for fire insurance that eliminates the risk. Suppose that the owner buys
insurance for $I5OO per year. This shows that the owner is risk-averse; he
prefers a certain loss of $i5oo to an uncertain loss with an expected value
of $iooo. He is willing to pay $500 to eliminate the risk.
If criminals too are risk averse, then they will prefer the relatively
certain sentences under guidelines to the risky sentences without them;
144. See KAY A. KNAPP, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR
EVALUATION 21 (1984).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. John H. Kramer & Robin L. Lubitz, Pennsylvania's Sentencing Reform: The Impact of
Commission-Established Guidelines, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 481, 496-97 (1985).
148. Id.
149. Id.
I50. KATHRYN ASHFORD & CRAIG MOSBAEK, OR. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL, FIRST YEAR REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES: NOVEMBER 1989 TO JANUARY 1990, at viii (1991).
151. See Ronald F. Wright, Flexibility in North Carolina Structured Sentencing, 1995-1997,
OVERCROWDED TIMES, December 1998, at 6 (explaining that most North Carolina judges have issued
sentences within the presumptive range of the sentencing guidelines).
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many criminals may be happy to know that the highest penalty they are
likely to receive is the upper limit of the guidelines range, instead of the
statutory maximum. That is, the risk from the pre-guidelines systems
imposes an additional cost on the criminal. Even if the average sentence
for a given offender under the pre-guidelines system and the guidelines
system were the same, the offender would view the risky pre-guidelines
sentence as riskier and therefore more costly. Therefore, the pre-
guidelines sentence would be a greater deterrent; it imposes on the
defendant not only the expected sentence, but also much risk. In
contrast, the effective penalty under the guidelines is lower, because it
imposes less risk. Under the guidelines, some potential offenders will no
longer be deterred because the costs of committing crime have
decreased.'52
For example, suppose that a guidelines system specified that the
sentence for armed robbery was an exact ten years. In contrast, the pre-
guidelines sentence had a one-half chance of being twenty years and one-
half chance of being zero. The expected pre-guidelines sentence was the
same ten years as under the guidelines, but with much more risk. A risk-
averse defendant would view the pre-guidelines gamble as more costly.
He would prefer ten years with certainty to a gamble with the possibility
of losing two decades. Thus, the pre-guidelines sentence would be a
greater deterrent.
Of course, the theory depends on criminals being risk-averse like
most other noncriminals. The theory will prove false if criminals, unlike
others, are risk-loving. Guidelines will not increase crime if criminals are
double-or-nothing risk-seekers who prefer sentencing Russian roulette to
a sentence that is modest but certain.'53 The empirical results will provide
some insight into whether criminals are like us: whether they are thrill-
seeking gamblers or whether they are normal, risk-averse people whose
152. Risk-averse criminals would perceive less risky sentences as less harsh. Risk-averse
individuals prefer mean-preserving decreases in risk. Although the literature is mixed on whether
criminals are risk-loving, so that they prefer increases in risk, or risk averse, crime will increase if even
a few criminals are risk averse and prefer the reduced variation of guidelines sentences. See Michael
Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 479, 479 (1975) (explaining the relative deterrent effects of certainty and severity in
punishment); Michael K. Block & V.E. Gerety, Some Experimental Evidence on Differences Between
Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 138 (995)
(arguing there is a significant difference between criminals and the general population in willingness to
accept risk); John Collins Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago view of the
Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 433 (1980) (arguing that criminals may be
risk averse with respect to money fines); Grogger, supra note 71, at 304; William S. Neilson & Harold
Winter, On Criminals' Risk Attitudes, 55 EcON. LETrERS 97, 102 (1997) (arguing that criminals can be
risk averse if they have atypical utility functions); Dryden Witte, supra note 74, at 79 (arguing that
most criminals are risk-loving with respect to both fines and imprisonment).
153. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing the theoretical implications of the risk-loving
offender).
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jobs just happen to be crime.
2. Theories Suggesting that Guidelines might Decrease Crime
a. Higher Average Sentences Could Increase Deterrence
Sentencing guidelines may decrease crime if guidelines cause
incarceration rates and average sentences for some offenders to increase.
The standard economic model of crime indicates that the level of
deterrence depends on two factors: the criminal's penalty if he is
punished and the probability that he will be punished.'54 Increases in
either factor increase the costs to the criminal of crime. Deterrence
should increase and crime should decrease if, after guidelines, states
punish more criminals and punish them more.
Moreover, apart from deterrence, higher incarceration rates and
longer prison terms for some offenders should decrease crime through
greater incapacitation. If, after adopting guidelines, a state arrests more
criminals and puts them in prison longer, fewer criminals remain on the
streets.
As often stated in enabling legislation, one goal of the guidelines in
many states is to increase the use of imprisonment for violent offenses.'55
Many states have achieved this goal. The states that have conducted pre-
and post-guidelines implementation studies have all found that, for
violent offenders, both the incarceration rate and average sentence
length increased substantially under the guidelines systems.' Moreover,
with the majority of states adopting truth-in-sentencing reforms before or
during this period, the higher average sentences translate into longer
time served in prison.'57 This is reflected in Figure 2 as a movement in the
average sentence to the right.
After Minnesota's implementation of sentencing guidelines in 198o,
the rate of imprisonment for violent crimes increased from 6i.i% to
85.9% and average sentence lengths for violent crimes also increased."
154. Becker, supra note 58, at 177. Professor Becker also identifies a "portmanteau" factor that
includes income available from legal and nonlegal sources, frequency of nuisance arrests and the
actors' willingness to commit a crime. Id.
155. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 17, at 38-42; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-8ol
(2003).
156. DruroN & WILSON, supra note 87, at 1, 3, 5-13. In contrast to their treatment of violent crimes,
some states purposely decreased imprisonment rates and sentence lengths for property crimes in order
to slow the growth in prison populations. See Kevin Reitz, Questioning the Conventional Wisdom of
Parole Release Authority, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Michael Tonry ed.,
2004) (finding that incarceration rates and sentences for property criminals decreased for some crimes
in some states). Less incarceration and lower penalties for property crimes may cause an increase in
property offenses by reducing the expected costs of this type of criminal activity. Because this
prediction applies to only certain property crimes in certain states, I do not include it as a one of the
four primary theories for why crime may increase after guidelines.
157. DITrON & WILSON, supra note 87, at 1, 3, 5-13.
158. KNAPP, supra note 144.
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After adoption of the 1982 Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines,
incarceration rates for violent crimes increased from 40% to 64% for
aggravated assault, from 74% to 86% for rape, and from 67% to 74% for
robbery.' 9 Sentence lengths also increased from 8.5 months to 13.6
months for aggravated assault, from 41.5 months to 51.9 months for rape,
and from 21.1 months to 21.6 months for robbery.'6°
The 1983 Washington guidelines caused imprisonment rates for
violent offenses to increase from 48.8% to 65.1 %.6' In addition, sentence
lengths for violent crimes increased: sentences for murder increased from
an average of seventy-five months to a range of io9 to 164 months;
robbery sentences increased from an average of forty months to a range
of forty to sixty months.
After Oregon's implementation of sentencing guidelines in 1989,
imprisonment rates for violent crimes increased from 62% to 89% for
homicide, from 29% to 37% for assault, from 40% to 6i% for rape, and
from 50% to 6i% for robbery. 62 Average sentence lengths for violent
crimes increased from 34.4 to ii9.8 months for homicide, from 26.1 to
32.1 months for assault, from 33.6 to 36.4 months for robbery, and from
40.1 to 76.7 months for rape.'
61
The North Carolina sentencing guidelines enacted in 1994 have
increased the imprisonment rate for violent offenders from 67% to 8i %
and increased the average sentence length from fifty-six months to
eighty-seven months.' 64 Although published data for Delaware are less
detailed, sentencing guidelines there have increased the incarceration
rate for violent offenders and led to longer sentences for them.'6
Examination of the interaction between sentence length and
sentence variation suggests that it is possible that guidelines' effects on
expected sentences may vary by the type of criminal. Average sentences
can increase even if variation in sentencing decreases. Guidelines usually
had the twin goals of reducing variation and increasing penalties: of
reducing very long and very short sentences and increasing the average
sentence. The pre- and post-guidelines implementation studies confirm
that Figure 2 accurately represents the guidelines' effects in most states:
the possibility of very long or very short sentences is reduced, yet the
159. Kramer & Lubitz, supra note 147, at 497.
i6o. O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 92, at 25.
I61. David Boerner, The Legislature's Role in Guidelines Sentencing in 'The Other Washington', 28
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 381, 391 (1993).
162. ED DEERY, OR. CRIM. JUST. COMMISSION, FELONY SENTENCING IN OREGON: 1994, at 49 (997),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/CJC/ocjcsac/Part3_P43-8o.pdf.
163. Id. at 50.
164. Robin L. Lubitz, Sentencing Changes in North Carolina, OVERCROWDED TIMES, June 1996, at i,
12.
i65. Richard S. Gebelein, SENTAC Changing Delaware Sentencing, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Jan.
1991, at 1, 1.
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average sentence has increased.
Therefore, the adoption of guidelines may increase the average
sentence for some groups of criminals, but decrease it for others. High-
risk criminals will expect shorter sentences because guidelines now
prevent judges from imposing the high sentences that formerly went to
high-risk criminals. Average criminals will expect longer sentences
because the guidelines caused the average sentence to increase. Low-risk
criminals could expect an increase in sentences even greater than the
increase for average criminals because judges no longer can impose the
mildest sentences on this group. If pre-guidelines sentences for low-risk
offenders were too lenient and did not deter, longer guidelines sentences
may reduce crime among this group. However, if prosecutors and judges
evade the guidelines, then the expected sentence for low-risk criminals
could decrease or remain unchanged. My empirical analysis will reveal
the net effect of these competing possibilities.
b. More Certain Sentences may Deter More Offenders
Guidelines could also decrease crime if more criminals are risk-
loving than risk-averse, and so view the smaller variance of guidelines
sentences as harsher. '66 Some scholars contend that at least some
criminals are risk-loving and are deterred less by less-certain sentences.
For example, Professors Block and Lind argue that "given a choice
between a certain sentence of five years and a lottery consisting of the
two equally probably outcomes, no [conviction] and a ten-year sentence,
an individual will always choose the lottery.,,67
Thus, some offenders may view the guidelines' less-variable
penalties as harsher; although guidelines reduce their chances of getting
a very high sentence, they also reduce their chances of getting a very low
sentence. If criminals perceive guidelines' more-certain sentences as
more harsh, guidelines will increase deterrence, decreasing crime.
Others have long argued that the increased uniformity of sentences
under the guidelines would increase deterrence, but not because
criminals were risk-loving. Instead, starting with Cesare Beccaria during
the Enlightenment, scholars have argued that uniform sentences increase
deterrence both because they permit potential criminals more accurately
to predict the sentence that they face and also because they allow society
to set the uniform sentence at the deterrent ideal.' 68 As discussed above,
166. I am using the technical definition whereby a person is said to be risk-loving if she "prefers an
uncertain prospect ... to a certain prospect of equal expected.., value." Cooter & Ulen, supra note
67, at 52. There may be many reasons why an offender may prefer the uncertain sentence that have
little to do with a love of gambling. For example, a person may have a high discount rate or there may
be a large stigma attached to any prison sentence.
167. Block & Lind, supra note 152, at 481.
I68. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 14-16 (David Young trans., Hackett Publ'g
Co. 1986) (1764); see also Thomas J. Miceli, Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Social
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proponents of both state and federal sentencing guidelines subscribed to
this theory. They argued that guidelines would increase deterrence by
making sentences more certain and less lenient.' 69
III. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND CRIME
Next, I examine the relationship between sentencing guidelines and
crime rates. Figure 3 presents the violent crime rates both for states that
adopt sentencing guidelines during the period 196O-2ooo and for states
that do not adopt guidelines during this period.'70 The violent crime rate
is defined as the ratio of violent crimes to the population divided by
100,000.
FIGURE 3. VIOLENT CRIME RATES IN GUIDELINES AND NON-
GUIDELINES STATES
900
800 - S
Non-Guidelines Stales 
700 s
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1960 1964 1969 1972 1976 190 194 1988 1992 1996 2000
Both guidelines and non-guidelines states exhibit the same general
trends in violent crime rate: violent crime rates increased until the early
199os and then began decreasing. Throughout this period, crime rates
were slightly higher in states that did not adopt guidelines between 1960-
2000.
Values (Univ. of Conn. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 2004-23, 2004).
169. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
170. The data for Figures 3 and 4 are from FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL ARCHIVE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, available at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/
dataonline/Search/Crime/State/TrendsInOneVar.cfm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
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Figure 4 presents property crime rates for guidelines and non-
guidelines states. Again, the general trend is the same; property crime
rates increased until the early i98os and then began decreasing. During
most of this period, property crime rates were higher in non-guidelines
states. However, in the early 199os, the property crime rates of non-
guidelines states began to decrease more quickly, reaching lower
absolute levels than those of guidelines states.
FIGURE 4. PROPERTY
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Although Figures 3 and 4 reveal differences in the crime rates
between guidelines and non-guidelines states, they offer little evidence
on the relationship between guidelines and crime. Instead, to test the
competing predictions of Part II, I use a state-level dataset covering all
U.S. states for the period 196o-2000; that is, the data include information
on each of the fifty states for each year of this period.'' The state-level
data allow me to include in my analysis state-specific economic and
demographic variables. By controlling for these characteristics, I can
better isolate the effect of sentencing policy. 7 '
070. See FBI, supra note 170.
172. Because state-level data allows me to control for state-specific factors, it permits a more
precise estimation of the relationship between guidelines and crime than would national data.
However, there is some aggregation bias even in state-level data. That is, there may be some important
county-specific or city-specific factors that I cannot control for in state-level data.
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To test the relationship between sentencing guidelines and crime, I
estimate an equation that measures how crime rates respond both to the
sentencing guidelines and to other demographic and economic factors. I
perform several different estimations to test different hypotheses about
the relationship between sentencing guidelines and crime. All of the
estimations are based on the same equation, but with slight variations in
the definition of the sentencing-guidelines variable.
A. THE MODEL'S TECHNICAL STRUCTURE
For technically-inclined readers, the system is in symbols:
Ci = a + A3 SG,, + A ECONi,, + 3DEMOt + 1 POLICEt + fAs, + A36y, + 6,, (I)
where C is the state's crime rate and SG is a state-level variable that
indicates whether the state has sentencing guidelines. As discussed
below, different estimations use different variations of SG. The economic
variables in ECON are real per capita personal income and the
unemployment rate. The three demographic variables in DEMO are the
percentages of population age fifteen to nineteen, age twenty to twenty-
four, and who belong to a minority group. The variable POLICE
measure the state's number of full-time state police employees. As is
standard practice, the model includes state and year dummy variables'73:
the model includes an indicator, s, for each state that captures
unobservable differences among states that are constant through time,
and year indicators, y, that measure any variable that changes over time
in all states. The system of equations is estimated for seven separate
crime rates: the rate of murder, aggravated assault, robbery, rape,
burglary, larceny, and auto theft.
B. DETAILS OF THE MODEL
Equation i measures the relationship between crime rates and
sentencing guidelines while controlling for many other factors that also
affect crime rates. To determine whether a change in crime is really due
to sentencing guidelines, it is necessary to control for as many other
factors as possible to ensure that the results are not caused by a
confounding variable. That is, if a third variable that has significant
relationships with both guidelines and crime was omitted from my
equation, my analysis may erroneously attribute to the guidelines
variable the relationship between crime and the omitted third variable.
Ideally, we could quantify and include any factor that was related to
crime. In reality, researchers include as many variables as is technically
possible given data constraints, especially variables that may have
173. A dummy variable is a yes-no indicator with only two possible values, o and I. WILLIAM H.
GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 116-18 (5th ed. 2003).
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significant relationships with both crime and guidelines.
The economic variables in ECON are used as proxies for legitimate
and illegitimate earning opportunities. An increase in legitimate earning
opportunities increases the opportunity cost of committing crime, and
should result in a decrease in the crime rate. For example, if more
higher-paying jobs become available, then criminals may stop
committing crimes, and obtain these jobs instead. Likewise, an increase
in illegitimate earning opportunities increases the expected benefits of
committing crime, and should result in an increase in the crime rate.
The economic variables that I use are real per capita personal
income and the unemployment rate. Both measure criminals' legitimate
earning alternatives. The income variable measures criminals' general
prospects in the legitimate labor market. The unemployment variable is a
proxy for overall labor market conditions and the availability of
legitimate jobs for potential criminals. The income variable also
measures illegitimate opportunities. The more income that people earn,
the more wealth that is available to steal. Other studies have found that
crime responds to both measures of income and unemployment, but that
the effect of income on crime is stronger.'74
The demographic variables in DEMO include the percentages of the
state population age fifteen to nineteen, age twenty to twenty-four, and
the percentage belonging to a minority group. The age and race variables
represent the possible differential treatment of certain segments of the
population by the justice system, changes in the opportunity cost of time
through the life cycle, and racially-based differences in earning
opportunities. For example, an increase in crime could be due to an
increase in the number of young minorities, who, because of racial
discrimination by employers, have no legitimate job opportunities, and
instead turn to crime. These economic and demographic variables are
standard and appropriate, and they have been included in many other
empirical studies of crime."'
174. See, e.g., Eric D. Gould et al., Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the
United States: 1979-1997, 84 REV. EcON. & STAT. 45, 58 (2003).
175. See Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New
Evidence from Post Moratorium Panel Data, 5 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 344, 352-54 (2003); John R. Lott,
Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 39-48 (i997); David B. Mustard, Reexamining Criminal Behavior: The Importance of Omitted
Variable Bias, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 205, 205 (2003); Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The
Full Deterrent Effect of California's Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (2002)
[hereinafter Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike]; Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals,
and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth about Truth-in-Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & ECoN. 509 (2002)
[hereinafter Shepherd, The Truth about Truth-in-Sentencing Laws]; Earl L. Grinols & David B.
Mustard, Casinos, Crime and Community Costs 26 (EconWPA, Law and Economics, Paper No.
o5oooi, 20o4); John R. Lott, Jr. & William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public Shootings, Bombings,
and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law Enforcement io-i 5
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The police employment variable, POLICE, is included because
increased numbers of police may deter crime, not by changing the size of
expected penalties, as with sentencing guidelines, but by changing the
probability that criminals will be caught. More police may increase
detection and apprehension, increasing the expected costs of engaging in
criminal activity, and deterring some crime. This variable should have a
negative relationship with crime rates.
As is standard and appropriate in such analysis, the equation also
includes a set of time dummy variables that capture national trends and
influences affecting all states but varying over time. The variables correct
for the possibility that a change in crime rates may be due, not to
sentencing guidelines, but to national trends in crime rates or other
factors that affect all states, such as the passage of federal legislation or
changes in medical technology. In addition, state dummies are included
to control for unobservable variables that differ among states, such as
cultural differences, attitudes towards crime, or differences in the justice
system. Two states may continually have different crime rates, not
because of differences in sentencing, but because of other unobservable
differences between the two states. The state dummy variables will
capture any factors that I have not otherwise included that are constant
for a state over time.
As is normal and appropriate, I estimate equation I using a least-
squares regression. I also control for possible heteroskedasticity and
nonnormality of regression errors that result from variation in states'
sizes. Since the dependent variable and most control variables are in per
capita rates, I use the square root of the state population as the weight in
the generalized least squares estimation. In addition, I use robust
standard errors to correct for any residual heteroskedasticity of unknown
form or nonnormal error distributions. These corrections yield consistent
estimates of the variance of the estimated coefficients, causing the entire
estimation to be efficient.
C. THE MODEL'S THREE VARIATIONS
I estimate three different variations of equation I. In the first
variation, the sentencing guidelines variable is a yes-no dummy variable
that indicates when a state has a sentencing guidelines system in place.
This variation tests the relationship between sentencing guidelines and
crime, but treats every guidelines system the same, not distinguishing
among their differences. The results will show the average relationship
between guidelines and crime across all states.
In contrast, the second and third variations test whether the
guidelines systems have different relationships with crime across states,
(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 73, 2000).
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depending on the degree of compliance required by each guidelines
system. The several theories that I present in Part II suggest that crime
may increase more as guidelines become more mandatory; the more
mandatory the guidelines, the less likely judges will depart from the
guidelines' sentencing ranges. Reviewing each of the theories, the more
mandatory the guidelines, the more firmly the guidelines will prevent
judges from giving longer sentences to high-risk defendants, reducing
deterrence of high-risk offenders. Likewise, the more mandatory the
guidelines, the more that prosecutors may be likely to under-charge and
judges may be more likely to acquit certain low-risk offenders.
Moreover, risk-averse criminals may consider mandatory sentencing
ranges as less harsh because they can be assured that their sentence will
lie somewhere in the range. All of these forces may combine to increase
crime even more than it would be increased by a more voluntary system.
In the second variation, I represent the degree of compliance
required by each state's guidelines with four separate dummy variables.
Each dummy variable represents one of the four positions in the
National Center for State Courts' mandatory/voluntary continuum in
Table 3; the categories arrange states based on the extent to which their
sentencing guidelines were considered mandatory.' 76 In effect, this
approach estimates the relationship between guidelines and crime for the
four categories of states separately. That is, this variation will reveal
whether the relationship between guidelines and crime differs across the
four categories of guidelines systems.
In contrast, the third variation employs only one sentencing-
guidelines variable: the variable remains zero for non-guidelines states
and takes values one through four based on the states' place in the
mandatory/voluntary continuum. Whereas the second variation tests
whether the relationship between guidelines and crime is different for
the different categories of states, this variation examines whether, as
guidelines become more mandatory, the relationship between guidelines
and crime changes systematically. That is, these results will reveal the
marginal effect on crime as guidelines move along the
mandatory/voluntary continuum.
D. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results indicate that sentencing guidelines are associated with an
increase in almost all crime rates. The more mandatory are the
guidelines, the larger is the increase in crime. The results are consistent
across the model's three variations. The first variation reveals that, on
average, guidelines states have higher crime rates than would be
176. For a discussion of the method by which the states were assigned to each category, see supra
note 56 and accompanying text.
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expected if they had no guidelines.' 7' The second variation shows, in
addition, that the more mandatory a state makes compliance with the
guidelines, the higher its crime rate: states with mandatory systems have
higher crime rates than would be expected under more voluntary
systems.18 Finally, the third variation shows that each movement to a
more mandatory level among the four categories of guidelines is
associated with a 3.3% increase in violent crime and a 3.1% increase in
property crime.
79
r. Variation i
The full results for all variables for the model's first variation are
reported in the table in Appendix i. The table indicates the relationship
between crime rates and both sentencing guidelines and each control
variable for each of the seven crimes. For each crime, the top number in
each cell in the table is the regression coefficient, which indicates the
magnitude and direction of the relationship with each crime. A negative
coefficient indicates that a variable has an inverse relationship with
crime. For example, a negative coefficient on the guidelines variable
would indicate that adoption of sentencing guidelines is associated with a
decrease in crime. In contrast, a positive coefficient indicates that a
variable has a positive relationship with crime. For example, a positive
coefficient on the guidelines variable would indicate that adoption of
sentencing guidelines is associated with an increase in crime.
In addition, the table reports the t-statistic for each coefficient. In
each cell, it is the bottom number in parentheses. T-statistics equal to or
greater than 1.645 are considered statistically significant at the io% level
and t-statistics equal to or greater than 1.96 are considered statistically
significant at the 5% level. A t-statistic of 1.645 means that there is 90%
certainty that the coefficient is different from zero. Empiricists typically
require t-statistics of at least 1.645 to conclude that one variable affects
another in the direction indicated by the coefficient.' 8°
Table 4 summarizes the most important results from Appendix I. It
presents the coefficient and t-statistics for the guidelines variable in the
model's first variation for each of the seven crimes.
177. See discussion infra Part III.D.i.
178. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
179. See discussion infra Part III.D.3.
18o. For each regression, the table also reports R-squared statistics. In contrast to the t-statistics,
which measure the reliability of each individual coefficient, the R-squared measures the regression's
overall goodness of fit. GREENE, supra note 173, at 33-34. That is, the R-squared measures how much
of the overall variation in the dependent variable, here the crime rate, is explained by the explanatory
variables. Id. Thus, the R-squared of a regression will vary between o and i. Id. An R-squared of o
means that the explanatory variables explain none of the dependant variable's variation. Id. An R-
squared of i means that the explanatory variables explain all of the variation. Id. The closer the R-
squared is to i, the better the regression explains the data. Id.
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The results are striking. Sentencing guidelines are associated with
crime increases in six of the seven crime categories; for six of the seven
crimes, the coefficient for the sentencing-guidelines variable is positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level. Guidelines are associated
with increases in murders, robberies, rapes, burglaries, larcenies, and
auto thefts.
TABLE 4: RESULTS OF GUIDELINES VARIABLE IN
VARIATION
COEFFICIENT
C (T-STATISTIC)
Murder 1.07(6.73)*
Aggravated Assault 3.39(0.48)
Robbery 33.55(5.64)*
5.6o
Rape (8.oi)*
Burglary 68-78
io6.62
Larceny (3.55)*
Auto Theft 97.81(8.85)*
MODEL'S FIRST
Note: Table reports estimated coefficients and the absolute values of t-
statistics in parentheses and "*" represents significance at the 5% level.
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The coefficient on the sentencing guidelines variable in the
aggravated assault equation is statistically insignificant. This result may
indicate that guidelines have no effect on the commission of aggravated
assaults. However, the result could also be caused by defects in the data
on aggravated assaults: during the time period that my study addresses,
many states changed their definitions of aggravated assault." '
Not only are the coefficients statistically significant, they are also
significant as a practical matter. The results indicate that, in 2000, the last
year of my data, the average state with sentencing guidelines experienced
violent crime rates that were approximately 8% higher than they would
have been without guidelines. Likewise, property crime rates in 2000
were approximately 7% higher in the average guidelines state than they
would have been without guidelines.""
2. Variation 2
In the model's second variation, there are four sentencing guidelines
variables, one for each position on the mandatory/voluntary continuum.
Table 5 reports the coefficients and t-statistics of each of the guidelines
variables in this variation.
181. See KNAPP, supra note 144, at 2i; Wright, supra note 151, at io.
182. I calculated the percentage changes as follows. The coefficients in Table 4 are the partial
derivatives of crime per ioo,ooo population with respect to the existence of a sentencing guidelines
system. That is, the coefficients describe the increased crime in guidelines states per ioo,ooo in the
state's population. Multiplying each coefficient by ioo,ooo and dividing by the total population in
sentencing-guidelines states in 2000 gives the total change in the number of crimes as a result of
guidelines systems in 2oo0, the most recent year of data. To compute the percentage change in violent
crimes, I divide the total change in murders, aggravated assaults, robberies, and rapes, by the total
number of these crimes that occurred in guidelines states in 20oo. The 95% confidence interval for the
percentage increase in violent crimes is 5% to ii%. The 8% that I report is the middle of this interval.
To compute the percentage change in property crimes, I divide the total change in the burglaries,
larcenies, and auto thefts, by the total number of these crimes that occurred in guidelines states in
2000. The 95% confidence interval for the percentage increase in property crimes is 4%-I0%, and 7%
is the halfway point.
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TABLE 5: RESULTS OF FOUR GUIDELINES VARIABLES IN MODEL'S
SECOND VARIATION
8 3
CONTINUUM POSITION
First Second Third Fourth
(Most (Most
Voluntary) Mandatory)
CRIME COEFFICIENT (T-STATISTIC)
Murder 1.49 1.50 .79 .56(5.04)* (6.37)* (4.I4)* (I.9o)+
Aggravated 25.53 -6.41 12.14 -26.30
Assault (2.76)* (0.70) (1.21) (2.04)*
1.32 18.59 38.56 115.85
Robbery (o.I6) (2.24)* (6.o8)* (8.o9)*
Rape -5.91 7.13 5.o8 4.50(5.o5)* (6.38)* (6.07)* (4.72)*
-27.26 34.29 57.46 52516Burglary (0.86) (1.43) (2.36)* (IO.O9)*
Larceny 296.75 19.55 104.05 753.83(2.88)* (0.48) (2.72)* (Io.39)*
Auto Theft 105.I8 82.06 104.0 153.26(5.66)* (5.85)* (7.26)* (4.87)*
% INCREASE
IN VIOLENT 4.6% 5.6% 8.1% 19.0%
CRIMES
% INCREASE
IN PROPERTY 9.9% 2.3% 6.7% 32.4%
CRIMES
As with the first variation, states with sentencing guidelines tend to
have more crime. Moreover, as theory predicts, the more mandatory a
state's guidelines, the higher the increases in crime. This is seen most
easily in the bottom two rows in Table 5, where I have separately
combined the coefficients for violent crimes and for property crimes, and
183. Table reports estimated coefficients and the absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.
and "+" represent significance at the 5% and io% levels, respectively.
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then transformed the coefficients into percentage changes.
For violent crimes in 2000, all categories of sentencing guidelines,
regardless how mandatory, are associated with increases in violent crime
compared to non-guidelines states. The percentage increases for each of
the four categories of guidelines systems follow the predicted pattern.
The guidelines systems that are most voluntary are associated with a
4.6% increase in crime over non-guidelines states. Guidelines systems
that lie in the second position of the mandatory/voluntary continuum are
associated with'a slightly higher 5.6% increase in violent crimes. The
average increase is a still-higher 8.1% for the systems in the next-stricter
third category. Finally, the guidelines systems that are the most
mandatory are associated with a 19% increase in violent crimes over
non-guidelines states84
The results are similar, though a bit less even, for property crimes.
As with violent crime, states with sentencing guidelines, regardless how
mandatory, tended to have more property crime. Compared with non-
guidelines states in 2000, the guidelines systems that are most voluntary
are associated with a 9.9% increase in property crime. Guidelines
systems in the second position on the continuum are associated with a
2.3% increase, and systems in the third position have approximately
6.7% more crime. Finally, the most mandatory systems are associated
with a 32% increase.' Although the results of the last three positions are
consistent with the predicted increasing relationship between required
compliance and property crimes, the first position is not associated with
the smallest increase in property crimes. However, the results are not
surprising because only one state represents this most voluntary position.
We would expect that states should, on average, exhibit the increasing
relationship between required compliance and crimes. However, because
there are so many differences among states, we would not expect every
state to conform to the relationship perfectly.
3. Variation 3
The results for the model's third variation yield conclusions that are
consistent with the second variation: sentencing guidelines are associated
with increases in crime, and the more mandatory the guidelines, the
greater the increase. Recall that the sentencing guidelines variable in this
variation takes on values from zero to four, depending on how
mandatory the guidelines are in each state. Table 6 reports the
184. The computation of the average percentage change in violent crimes in the second variation is
identical to the computation in the first variation. The 95% confidence interval for each category of
states is: category 1, o%-t2%; category 2, 1.7%-9.5%; category 3, 5.3%-io.8%; and category 4, 7.8%-
30.2%. The reported percentages are the midpoints of each of the intervals.
i85 The 95% confidence interval for each category of states is: category 1, 4%-16%; category 2,
1.5%-3.1%; category 3, 2.9%-Io.6%; and category 4,25%-39%.
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coefficients on this variable for each of the seven crimes.
The coefficients on the guidelines variable are positive and
significant for all crimes except aggravated assault, which has an
insignificant coefficient. The positive and significant coefficients indicate
that crime increases more as guidelines become more mandatory. For
example, each increase in position on the continuum, representing a one-
step increase in the degree of compliance required by the guidelines, is
associated in 2000 with approximately a 3.3% increase in violent crimes
and a 3. 1% increase in property crimes."'
TABLE 6: RESULTS OF GUIDELINES VARIABLE IN MODEL'S THIRD
VARIATION'7
COEFFICIENT
(T-STATISTIC)
Murder 0.33(5.86)*
Aggravated Assault 139(0.52)
LRcey 14.27Robbery __ (6.58)*
Rape 1.96Rape (8.io)*
Burglary33.15
Burglary(4.26)*
Larceny 49.8
(4.23)*
Auto Theft 36.24(8.73)*
E. ENSURING RESULTS ARE ROBUST
I also performed several alternative estimations to minimize the
probability that factors other than sentencing guidelines and my other
control variables are causing the increasing crime rates: I checked for
reverse causation, examined whether other sentencing reforms might be
I86. Again, the computation of the average percentage change in crime as states move along the
continuum is similar to the computation in the model's first variation. See supra note 182. The 95%
confidence interval for the percentage increase in violent crimes with each one-position move along
the continuum is 2.3%-4.3%. The 95% confidence interval for the percentage increase in property
crimes with each one-position move along the continuum is 1.9%-4.3%. The reported percentages are
again the midpoints of the intervals.
187. Table reports estimated coefficients and the absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.
represents significance at the 5% level.
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causing the increases in crime, and I applied several standard tests of
robustness. The results, which the table in Appendix 2 summarizes,
demonstrate that the results indeed are robust.
i. No Reverse Causation
I first check whether reverse causation is driving my primary
results.'M That is, I check whether the positive relationship between
crime and sentencing guidelines is due not to guidelines increasing crime,
but to increasing crime causing states to adopt guidelines.
The evidence suggests that it is unlikely that the positive relationship
between crime rates and guidelines is explained by reverse causation.
Despite the argument of many law-and-order supporters that sentencing
guidelines were necessary to curb increasing crime rates, sentencing
guidelines were actually enacted by states that were experiencing crime
rates that were decreasing. The second column in Table 7 reveals the
average trends in crime rates when states adopted sentencing guidelines.
In the year that states enacted guidelines, the rates of murder, robbery,
burglary, larceny, and auto theft were, on average, decreasing.
TABLE 7: TRENDS IN CRIME RATES BEFORE ENACTMENT OF
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AVERAGE DIFFERENCE
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE BETWEEN GUIDELINES
CRIME CHANGE IN CRIME RATES STATES AND NON-
IN THE YEAR STATES GUIDELINES STATES IN
ENACTED GUIDELINES THE YEAR STATES
ENACTED GUIDELINES
Murder -1.2% -2.2%
Aggravated Assault o.I1% -0.4%
Robbery -i.6% -0.89%
Rape 1.2% o.o6%
Burglary -3.9% -0.74%
Larceny -1.9% -1.2%
Auto Theft -0.23% 0.35%
Moreover, the states that adopted guidelines tended to be the states
with the most swiftly decreasing crime rates; for most crimes, the crime
decreases in states that adopted guidelines were greater at the time of
i88. Endogeneity tests confirm that OLS is a consistent estimator for equation I for all crimes. See
RUSSELL DAVIDSON & JAMES G. MACKINNON, ESTIMATION AND INFERENCE IN ECONOMETRICS 237-42
(993).
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adoption than the crime decreases in states that did not. The third
column of Table 7 shows the average difference in each crime rate
between guidelines states and non-guidelines state in the year of the
guidelines' adoption.' 9
The table makes clear that for the crimes of murder, robbery,
burglary, and larceny, not only were crime rates decreasing when states
adopted guidelines, they were decreasing faster than in non-guidelines
states. Although aggravated assault was increasing when states enacted
guidelines, it was increasing slower than in non-guidelines states. Rape
was increasing faster in guidelines states and auto theft was decreasing
slower in guidelines states, relative to non-guidelines states.
Table 7 shows that it is unlikely that my results can be explained by
reverse causation between guidelines and crime. To the contrary,
because most crime rates were decreasing at the time of enactment, and
decreasing faster than in non-guidelines states, any reverse causation
would introduce a bias in the opposite direction of my results. Because
crime rates tended to be declining in guidelines states at the same time
that the states were adopting the guidelines, the true impact of the
guidelines in increasing crime is probably larger than my results show,
not smaller. The guidelines' crime-increasing impact was being partially
offset by the guidelines states' independent trend toward less crime.
In addition, I confirm that my results are robust to reverse causation
by using instrumental variables estimation, a standard statistical
method."g In my instrumental variables estimation, I use the following
variables as instruments for the enactment of sentencing guidelines: the
percentage of the state population voting Republican in each presidential
election and the percentage of the state legislature that was Republican.
Econometric tests suggest that these are valid instruments in every crime
equation; that is, they are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly
excluded from the estimated equation i.
The table in Appendix 2 reveals that my primary conclusions are
robust to the IV estimation's controls for possible reverse causality.
Sentencing guidelines are associated with increases in all seven crimes,
even aggravated assault, which was insignificant in the primary model.
Moreover, the coefficients increase substantially in magnitude,
suggesting that, as the raw data suggest, any reverse causality produces a
bias in the opposite direction of my primary results.
2. Impacts of Other Sentencing Reforms
I also check whether other sentencing reforms, such as truth-in-
189. Results are also similar for longer windows of time before the adoption of guidelines.
19o. See GREENE, supra note 173, at 397-98.
191. See DAVIDSON & MACKINNON, supra note 188, at 235-36. Nevertheless, results could vary with
the choice of instruments.
1Vol. 58:533
BLAKELY'S SILVER LINING
sentencing legislation and three-strikes laws, are driving my results.
Theoretically, it is unlikely that these laws are causing the crime
increases I attribute to sentencing guidelines for several reasons.
First, these reforms were adopted in different years from sentencing
guidelines.'92 In the years before the adoption of sentencing guidelines,
crime was decreasing in guidelines states at rates equal to, or even faster
than, in non-guidelines states. 93 Whatever was influencing crime rates in
guidelines states before the guidelines' adoption-be it three-strikes
laws, truth-in-sentencing laws, or something else-was causing crime
there to decrease, not increase.
Second, it is unlikely that three-strikes and truth-in-sentencing
reforms in guidelines states would be driving the increases in violent
crime because studies have shown that both of these reforms are
associated with reductions in violent crime, not increases.94 It is possible
that crime decreases in non-guidelines states with three-strikes and truth-
in-sentencing laws could make it seem that crime has increased in
relative terms in guidelines states that lack the other reforms. However,
this too is unlikely because most states with the other two sentencing
reforms are also sentencing guidelines states, not non-guidelines states."
In addition, to ensure that other sentencing reforms are not driving
my results, I reestimate variation I of my model, but now including
dummy variables for whether a state has three-strikes laws or truth-in-
sentencing laws. I 6 Again, the conclusions of the primary model do not
change. Sentencing guidelines are associated with increases in murders,
robberies, rapes, burglaries, larcenies, and auto thefts, even when
controlling for other sentencing reforms.
3. Standard Robustness Checks
Finally, I perform a series of standard robustness checks. I estimate
the model in a semi-log functional form where the crime variable is
measured as the natural log of the respective crime rate.'97 I also correct
192. See supra note 87.
193. See discussion supra Part III.E.i.
194. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike, supra note 175, at 161; Shepherd, The Truth about Truth-in-
Sentencing Laws, supra note 175, at 51.
195. SABOL ET AL., supra note 46, at i i.
196. Another important sentencing reform has been mandatory minimums. I do not include data
on mandatory minimums because the types of mandatory minimum laws are extremely diverse among
states in terms of the crimes covered, offenders to which the mandatory minimums apply, and the
minimums imposed. It is unlikely that mandatory minimums could bias my regression results because
they were almost all adopted in the 197os, well before sentencing guideline. OSTROM ET AL., supra note
56, at 20.
197. Although previous studies have shown that a levels regression is the theoretically correct
specification in an economic model of crime, some crime papers have used the semi-log functional
form. See Dezhbakhsh et al., supra note 175 (using levels regression); John J. Donohue & Steven D.
Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 1i6 Q.J. OF ECON. 379, 397-99 (2001) (using the
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for possible clustering effect-dependence within clusters (groups, which
are states here)-to ensure that my t-statistics are not artificially high.
Next, I perform unweighted panel data regressions, as opposed to
population-weighted. Then, I include state-specific trends, and finally, I
exclude all control variables except for state and year fixed-effects.
Appendix 2 shows that the results are robust to the alternative
specifications. As in the primary model, the coefficients on the
sentencing guidelines variable are, in general, positive and significant for
murder, robbery, rape, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. Moreover, the
coefficient for aggravated assault, which was insignificant in the main
specification, becomes positive and statistically significant in two of the
alternate specifications.
IV. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The theoretical predictions and empirical results in the previous
sections are important for policymakers to consider as the states
reexamine their current sentencing systems in response to Blakely and
Booker. I now discuss the various alternate sentencing systems that
Justice Breyer suggested in his dissent in Blakely and further discussed in
his majority opinion in Booker: a "pure charge" regime, a fully
indeterminate sentencing system, sentencing juries, and a system of
advisory sentencing guidelines.""5 Specifically, I discuss the potential
impact on crime of each alternate system, based on the degree to which
each system limits judicial discretion. I do not here discuss other aspects
of the alternate systems, such as the fundamentally important issues of
justice, ease of administering the system, and constitutionality. I leave
those for another article. They are beyond the scope of this one.
I discuss the alternatives in descending order of the degree to which
they might tend to increase crime: a pure charge system may increase
crime the most, followed by jury factfinding, advisory guidelines, and
indeterminate sentences, which may increase crime the least.
First, in a pure charge sentencing system, each offense requires a
specific sentence, regardless of any mitigating or aggravating factors."9
Prosecutors would charge defendants with a series of facts that, taken
together, constitute a crime.2" Every criminal convicted of that crime
would receive the same sentence. 0' The judge would have no discretion
to deviate from the sentence."'
semi-log functional form); Lott & Mustard, supra note 175; Mustard, supra note 175.
198. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246-48 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
330-40 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 330 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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My empirical results suggest that a pure charge system might be
associated with even higher crime rates than exist under present
guidelines systems. The system would be equivalent to sentencing
guidelines that were completely mandatory. My results show that the
more mandatory the guidelines, the greater the associated increase in
crime.
Second, in Blakely, Justice Breyer predicted that legislators would
find jury factfinding the most feasible choice.03 This option retains
current guidelines systems, but modifies them to conform to Blakely.
Judges would be able to depart downward from the sentencing
guidelines' range, but they would not be able to depart upward unless
aggravating facts were proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury."0 4
My results suggest that this choice might lead to increases in crime
compared to existing guidelines, but not as severely as in a pure charge
system. Crime may increase because the judge's discretion to choose
upward departures would be limited. The results suggest that the more
that a guidelines system limits judges' discretion, the higher the crime
rate. However, crime may not increase as much as for a pure-charge
system because jury factfinding retains the judge's productive discretion
to depart downward.
Third, in Booker, Justice Breyer suggested that the best solution to
Blakely would be advisory sentencing guidelines." This system "requires
a sentencing court to consider the Guidelines ranges... but it permits
the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as
well. ,2°6
My results suggest that this approach may produce the least crime of
Justice Breyer's four alternatives, except for completely indeterminate
sentencing. This approach mirrors the approach of the least mandatory
category of sentencing guidelines in our analysis. Results suggest that the
associated increase in crime for such a system, compared to no-
guidelines/indeterminate sentencing, is 4.6% in the model's variation 2
and 3.3 % in variation 3.
Fourth, the last of Justice Breyer's choices was to abandon
sentencing guidelines: to return to a system of indeterminate sentencing
where the judge or a parole board has almost complete discretion over
sentence length."° This sentencing regime would mirror the regime
present in most states until the late 1970S and early i98os, when some
states began to adopt sentencing guidelines.
203. Id. at 336-37.
204. See id.
205. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005).
2o6. See id.
207. See id. at 246.
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Of the four alternatives, my results suggest that states that adopted
this alternative may experience the least crime. States without sentencing
guidelines tend to have substantially less crime than states that have even
the least mandatory guidelines.
Although a return to indeterminate sentencing may lead to the least
crime, states should also focus on important considerations other than
deterrence, such as justice or efficiency. For example, a pure charge
system may be the best choice for some states, not because it could
increase crime, but because it eliminates seemingly-unjust sentencing
disparities or reduces costs by creating a simpler, more-efficient
sentencing process.
CONCLUSION
The post-Blakely sentencing world is not as bleak as many
proponents of sentencing guidelines fear. Both the theoretical analyses
and empirical results in this Article suggest that reduced discretion under
existing guidelines systems may have produced a stunning unintended
consequence: increased crime. Blakely provides a perfect opportunity for
states to modify their guidelines both to satisfy Blakely and to reduce or
eliminate this unfortunate side effect.
In this study, the first to use regression analysis to explore the
relationship between sentencing guidelines and crime, I show that,
contrary to the motivating expectations of the original tough-on-crime
supporters of guidelines, sentencing guidelines are associated with
increases, not decreases, in crime. The results are robust to several
different specifications and to estimations that control for sentencing
reforms other than guidelines systems. Furthermore, results indicate that
the more mandatory a guidelines system-the more strictly judges must
adhere to the guidelines-the greater the associated increase in crime.
The effects are not only statistically significant, but also large. On
average, sentencing guidelines are associated with an increase in violent
crimes of 8% and an increase in property crimes of 7%.
Increases in crime could be explained by any or all of the four
theoretical explanations that I have developed, all of which follow from
the economic model of crime. The results do not indicate which of the
theories is the most important explanation. All of the theories predict an
increase in crime that is consistent with the empirical results. Regardless,
the forces causing crime to increase were powerful. The results suggest
that crime increased even though sentencing guidelines were generally
accompanied by increases in both the incarceration rate and average
sentence length.
First, high-risk offenders may be committing more crime because
sentencing guidelines limit judges' ability to impose long sentences on
[Vol. 58:533
BLAKELY'S SILVER LINING
them. The results are consistent with the guidelines having prevented
judges from productively and efficiently distinguishing among defendants
and giving the longest sentences to defendants who are the least
deterrable.
Second, guidelines also limit the ability of judges to impose very
short sentences. Some prosecutors, judges, and juries may be unwilling to
impose the longer required sentences on low-risk offenders. Instead,
judges and juries may be acquitting such low-risk offenders, or
prosecutors may be dismissing charges. The lower penalties reduce
deterrence, explaining the increased crime. Prosecutorial undercharging
does not appear to be sufficient to eliminate the acquittals.
Third, also contributing to the increase in crime could be judges' and
prosecutors' sometimes following the guidelines and imposing longer
sentences on low-risk offenders. Studies show that longer sentences for
low-risk offenders often produce more recidivism because the longer an
offender's sentence, the worse his legitimate job prospects upon release,
and the more that the offender becomes infused with the prison's
criminal culture.
Fourth, some criminals may be perceiving sentences under the
guidelines as less harsh because the guidelines reduce the variation and
uncertainty in the possible sentences that a criminal receives. If criminals
are risk-averse, then the relatively certain guidelines sentence is
perceived as less harsh than the pre-guidelines system that offered
possibilities of either a long or short sentence. That guidelines caused
crime to increase is consistent with criminals' being risk-averse, contrary
to some other predictions in the literature.
As states reexamine their current sentencing systems in response to
Blakely and Booker, they should consider the lessons that this Article's
theoretical and empirical findings teach about the possible impacts on
crime of various replacement systems. Before these states choose
another alternative with greater determinacy, they should be sure to
include in their analysis the costs of the increased crime that further
constraints on judicial discretion may cause. Contrary to the assumption
of the original coalition that supported sentencing guidelines, guidelines
may not be a free lunch. They may not simultaneously reduce disparity,
simplify procedures, and reduce crime. Instead, uniformity and
simplification may be available only at the cost of increased crime.
208. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX I: FULL RESULTS OF FIRST VARIATION2
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT (T-STATISTIC) ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES VARIABLE
Model Agg. AutoSpecifications: Murder Assault Robbery Rape Burglary Larceny Theft
Sentencing
Guidelines 1.07 3-39 33.55 5.60 68.78 lO6.62 97.81
Dummy (6.75)* (0.48) (5.64)* (8.oi)* (3.57)* (3-55)* (8.85)*
Variable
Real Per -Rea Per 
-0.01 0.004 o.ol 0.04 0.13 -0.02Capita 0.00004 (3"6o)* (1.14) (3.26)* (398)* (7.45)* (2.23)*
Income (0.43)
Unemploy- -o.2o -i.18 1.31 -0.42 36.93 53.24 7-93
ment Rate (5.33)* (0.64) (0.63) (2.66)* (6.5i)* (5.89)* (2.40)*
Police -0.0oo4 0.009 0.01 -0.001 -0.003 -o.o8 0.002
Employment (3.57)* (1-57) (2.42)* (1.59) (0.13) (2.29)* (0.17)
Percent 15-19 -0.43 -9.46 17.21 3.39 64.94 169.49 -13.58
Years Old (2.99)* (1.26) (2.23)* (6.28)* (3.44)* (4.76)* (1-07)
Percent 20-24 0.92 7.30 -11.73 -2.20 -2.24 -97-74 25.13
Years Old (5.04)* (0.79) (1.21) (3-39)* (0.09) (2.i2)* (1.59)
Percent 0.28 3.05 1.75 -0.30 -21.09 -40.57 8.25
Minority (16.4)* (2.98)* (1.49) (3.52)* (8.2o)* (7.78)* (5.38)*
R-Squared .8704 .8710 .8425 .8626 .8828 .9113 .8178
209. Dependent Variable is the respective crime rate (crimes/loo,ooo population). Absolute values
of t-statistics are in parentheses. "*" and "+" represent significance at the 5% and lo% levels,
respectively. The estimated coefficients for year and state dummies are not shown.
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APPENDIX 2" SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS "
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES VARIABLE
Model Murder Agg. Robbery Rape Burglary Larceny Auto
Specifications: Assault Theft
IV Estimation IO.II 1048.5 493.6 51.04 2257.09 5917.78 1240.01(2.05)* (2.46)* (2.4)* (2.46)* (2.49)* (2.56)* (2.57)*
Controlling
for Other 0.97 4.J6 25.55 2.11 112.68 179.17 79.34
Sentencing (5.15)* (o.61) (4.08)* (3.03)* (5.92)* (5.47)* (5.99)*
Reforms
Semi-Log
Functional 0.15 -0.02 0.05 o.08 -0.002 -0.031 0.17
Form (8.34)* (1.02) (1.8o)+ (4.36)* (0.14) (2.6o)* (8.18)*
Controlling 1.07 3.39 33-55 5.60 68.78 1o6.62 97.81
for Clustering (2.85)* (0.12) (1.75)+ (2.I9)* (1.39) (1.13) (2.71)*
Effects
Unweighted o.69 15.70 25.43 6.81 57-85 182.o8 83.93
Specification (4.92)* (2.31)* (6.16)* (9.19)* (3.53)* (6.28)* (8.36)*
Including
State-Specific 0.17 -5.27 12.24 3-49 -IOI.I9 -89.82 55.62
Time Trends (0.84) (0.70) (2.13)* (4.41)* (4.03)* (2.39)* (4.57)*
Exluding All
Control
Variables 0.I9 -9.01 23.22 6.98 131.02 230.39 67.17
except State (1.o7) (1.18) (3.26)* (8.73)* (5.t8)* (4.91)* (5.67)*
and Year
Dummies
2In. Dependent Variable is the indicated form of the respective crime rate (crimes/ioo,ooo
population). Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. "*" and "+" represent significance at
the 5% level and io% level, respectively.
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